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I: Scope of Comment

T

he subject discussed in this comment-peacetime use of force on the
high seas against foreign vessels-is approached rather gingerly in
Chapter 3 of The Commander}s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. The
main thrust of the chapter is to protect United States persons and property
at sea by U.S. naval forces in peacetime against actions by pirates, terrorists
or insurgents, and against the hazards of the sea, such as storms or mechanical
failure. But the chapter deals also with such topics as transport of slaves,
international narcotics traffic and unauthorized broadcasting from
international waters; it also deals with the right of U.S. warships to approach
and visit vessels sailing on the high seas under a foreign flag if suspected of
such activities or in other special circumstances.
In the case of the transport of slaves, no direct guidance is given; if
confronted with such situation, "commanders should request guidance from
higher authority." Similar advice is given in the case of unauthorized
broadcasting. In both cases also it is noted (in paragraph 3.8) that the vessel
may be approached, stopped and boarded, and the ship's documents examined,
in order to verify its nationality. There the advice stops, and nothing is said
about possible search and seizure. While the last sentence of paragraph 3.8
suggests that the procedure for exercising the right of approach and visit is
similar to that used in exercising the belligerent right of visit and search,
it is not clear whether this statement applies only to "stateless vessels" with
which it is linked in a separate subparagraph, or also to other suspected vessels.
It is quite obvious, on the other hand, that the belligerent and peacetime
situations are quite different, and throughout history the United States has
strongly opposed this analogy (as will be documented later in this comment).
The issue of suppression of international narcotics traffic is even more
puzzling, as that traffic is not mentioned at all in paragraph 3.8, which lists
the only situations in which approach and boarding of foreign vessels were
allowed. Reliance is placed instead on "bilateral arrangements" (paragraph
3.6), or "Congressional direction" and "consent" of the foreign flag nation,
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
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granted by a bilateral agreement or ad hoc for the particular occasion
(paragraph 3.12.4). There seems to be admission here that there is no general
rule of international law authorizing such action, especially if the action
envisaged here should extend beyond approach and visit, including even
arrest, search and seizure.
It might be useful to the commander on the spot, as well as the "higher
authority" which is supposed to provide him with guidance, to explain the
history of the two main efforts to authorize warships to visit, search, and,
ifjustified, seize the vessels of other nations, and the reasons for the opposition
of some major powers, including for a long time the United States and even
today France, to this "strengthening" of the law and of the means to enforce
it. This comment will thus discuss primarily the efforts to strengthen the
control over transport of slaves and international narcotics traffic, with only
incidental references to piracy (where international law developed detailed
rules, which are generally accepted) and to the limited and by now mostly
obsolete arrangements for stopping the smuggling of alcoholic beverages into
the United States.
Since its early ~ays, the principle of the freedom of the high seas has been
subjected to a two-pronged attack: the efforts of some coastal states to extend
their jurisdiction far into the sea, and the assertion by some naval powers
of the right to ~xercise jurisdiction over the vessels of other states navigating
on the high seas. While the first attack has led to a dramatic diminution of
the area of the high seas, the second attack has led to such strong resistance
that it resulted in only minor inroads on the freedom of navigation of the
high seas. Nevertheless, in the last years of the twentieth century, after
stopping repeated attempts to subject foreign vessels on the high seas to search
and seizure in the name of abolishing the universally condemned slave trade
(which unfortunately still exists under different guises), a new danger to the
freedom of navigation on the high seas has arisen from unilateral attempts
to enforce national legislation on the high seas in an area almost as odioustraffic in narcotic drugs. In view of this development, it seems useful to
explore the reasons for the persistence of the original opposition to such
encroachments on the freedom of the seas, to consider the applicability of
these arguments to the current situation, and to suggest some means to
overcome the difficulties. 1 As this subject is still too- vast, this comment is
necessarily limited to a discussion of only some of the rules of international
law which relate to the activities of naval vessels on the high seas in time
of peace, authorizing some and prohibiting others.2

II. Crusade Against Slave Trade
The essence of the great principle of the freedom of the seas is that all '
nations have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the high seas for their

40

Law of Naval Operations

navigation. From this principle flow two additional principles: that a ship
on the high seas is subject only to the jurisdiction of the state whose flag
it flies and that no state has the right to interfere in any manner with vessels
of other states navigating upon the high seas in time of peace. Even in time
of war the right to visit, search or seize a neutral vessel has important limits,
and the state exceeding these limits must pay compensation to the neutral
state for any loss or damage caused to the vessel, its owner, crew, or cargo;
even more, freedom of navigation must be observed in time of peace, and
the violator must pay compensation proportional not only to the damage and
loss, but also to the gravity of the violation.3
These rules have been recognized for at least two hundred years. For
instance, in the often quoted statement in the 1817 Le Louis case, the eminent
British Admiralty judge, Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell), explained
these principles in the following manner:
Upon the first question, whether the right of search exists in time of peace, I have to
observe that two principles of public law are generally recognized as fundamental. One
is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude
creates no distinction of right; ... and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere
usurpation. This is the great foundation of public law, which ... mainly concerns the
peace of mankind, both in their public and private capacities, to [be] preserve[d]
inviolate. The second is, the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean
for their navigation. In places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of
all states meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state, or any
of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another.
I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the navigation of states
in amity upon the high seas, excepting that which the rights of war give to both
belligerents against neutrals. This right, incommodious as its exercise may occasionally
be to those who are subjected to it, has been fully established in the legal practice of
nations, having for its foundation the necessities of self-defence, in preventing the enemy
from being supplied with the instruments of war, and from having his means of
annoyance augmented by the advantages of maritime commerce. Against the property
of his enemy each belligerent has the extreme rights of war. Against that of neutrals,
the friends of both, each has the right of visitation and search, and of pursuing an inquiry
whether they are employed in the service of his enemy, the right being subject, in almost
all cases of an inquiry wrongfully pursued, to a compensation in costs and damages.4

A 1950 memorandum prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations
for the International Law Commission, after examining the pretensions of
various nations to claim dominion over vast areas of the sea, concluded that
the concept of the freedom of the seas which was developed to counteract
these claims means not only that every nation has an equal right to use the
high seas, but also that ships flying the flag of one state are prohibited from
interfering with ships flying the flags of other nationalities. The memorandum
pointed out that:
Such interference, which is naturally forbidden in the mutual relations of users, is not
even tolerated in the case of warships, which might be considered to have as their general
mission to watch over the maintenance of order and security at sea. In peace-time
warships have no police powers except over private vessels Hying their own flag. The
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general policy powers of warships on the high seas in respect of private foreign vessels
are limited to the right of approach, and do not comprise the right to check nationality
by examination of ships' papers. The only exception to this rule is in the case of grave
suspicion, and the State to which the investigating warship belongs is responsible for
any damage caused by an examination that proves to be unwarranted. A warship which
considers it necessary to interfere in this way with the navigation of a ship flying a
flag other than its own, assumes, and thereby involves the State to which it belongs
in, full responsibility for the action taken and for any possible damages. 5

In his opening statement to the 1958 Conference on the Sea, Admiral
Oswald S. Colclaugh called attention to the fact that the United States "had
often had to defend itself against the infringements of the principle [of the
freedom of the seas]," and that, therefore, it "attached great importance to
. "6
It.

A dispute arose as early as the 1790s between the United States and Great
Britain with respect to the British practice of stopping foreign vessels,
including the American ones on the high seas, and removing sailors considered
by the British to be still British subjects although they were naturalized
abroad. This British abuse of the right of visit and search was one of the reasons
for the War of 1812, and although this practice was in fact abandoned soon
thereafter, the United States continued to raise the issue for some thirtyyears. 7
The American objections were spelled out in 1823 by John Quincy Adams,
then Secretary of State:
[T]he United States have never disputed the belligerent right of search, as recognized
and universally practiced conformably to the laws of nations. They have disputed the
right of belligerents, under colour of the right of search for contraband of war, to seize
and carry away men, at the discretion of the boarding officer, without trial and without
appeal; men, not as contraband of war or belonging to the enemy, but as subjects, real
or pretended, of the belligerent himself, and to be used by him against his enemy. It
is the fraudulent abuse of the right of search for purposes never recognized or admitted
by the laws of nations; purposes in their practical operation of the deepest oppression
and most crying injustice, that the United States have resisted and will resist, and which
warns them against assenting to the extension in time of peace, of a right which
experience has shown to be liable to such gross perversion in time of war.8

The matter was only settled by an exchange of notes made in connection
with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842.9
When in 1807 the British Parliament prohibited slave trade by British
citizens,10 the British Government embarked on a crusade to stop this trade
also by citizens of other countries. Remembering the difficulties about the
impressment of seamen, the United States-though in 1807 it also prohibited
importation of slaves into the United Statesll-refused to concede to the
British Navy the right to visit and search vessels under the United States flag.
While British courts approved searches and seizures of American vessels
during the Napoleonic wars,12 Sir William Scott had to consider the seizure
in peacetime of Le Louis-mentioned above-which involved a French vessel,
condemned by the British admiralty court at Sierra Leone on the grounds
that it was equipped for carrying slaves, that it resisted the capture, and that
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in the process it "piratically killed" eight members of the crew of the British
cruiser. Sir William held that slave trade was not piracy nor a generally
accepted crime under the law of nations, and that its illegality under the laws
of both England and France was not a sufficient ground for the vessel's seizure.
He started with the premise that neither a British act of parliament, nor any
commission founded on it, can effect any right or interest of foreigners unless
they are founded upon principles and impose regulations that are consistent
with the law of nations. While a state has the "right to see that its own vessels
are duly navigated," it has no right "to visit and search all the apparent vessels
of other countries on the high seas, in order to institute an inquiry whether
they are not in truth British vessels violating British laws." He added that
a state should not make regulations which it "cannot enforce without
trespassing on the rights of others." He emphasized that
[t]o press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle
that stands in the way of its establishment; to force the way to the liberation of Africa
by trampling on the independence of other states in Europe; in short, to procure an
eminent good by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as
to public justice.

If a country should agree by convention to allow visit and search in time
of peace, it would be "for the prudence of states to regulate by that convention
the exercise of the right with all the softenings of which it is capable," and
to make sure that it would be "so constructed as not to excite just irritation."
He pointed out, finally, that France rejected a proposed treaty permitting
search on a reciprocal basis, "upon the express ground that she would not
tolerate any maritime police to be exercised on her subjects but by herself. "13
After the British Government concluded treaties with Spain, Portugal and
the Netherlands allowing, on a reciprocal basis, search and seizure of vessels
and adjudication by a mixed commission, the United States rejected a similar
treaty. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, claimed that in
accordance with this plan, citizens of the United States would be liable
in time of peace to have their vessels searched and with their persons seized and carried
away by the naval officer of a foreign power, subjected to the decision of a tribunal
in a foreign land, without benefit of the intervention of a jury of accusation or of a
jury of trial, by a court of judges and umpires half of whom would be foreigners and
all irresponsible to the supreme authorities of the United States. 14

On another occasion, Mr. Adams made clear, however, that
although Great Britain ... may be willing to abandon those of her subjects who defy
the laws and tarnish the character of their country by participating in this trade to the
dispensation ofjustice even by foreign hands, the United States are bound to remember
that the power which enables a court to try the gnilty authorizes them also to pronounce
upon the fate of the innocent and the very question of guilt or innocence is that which
the protecting care of their Constitution has reserved for citizens of this Union to the
exclusive decision of their own countrymen. This principle has not been departed from
by the statute which has branded the slave trader with the name, and doomed him to
the punishment, of a pirate. The distinction between piracy by the law of nations and
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piracy by statute is well known and understood in Great Britain; and while the former
subjects the transgressor guilty of it to the jurisdiction of any and every country into
which he may be brought or wherein he may be taken, the latter forms a part of the
municipal criminal code of the country where it is enacted and can be tried only by
its own courts.

At that time, Mr. Adams explained also, with real passion, that the United
States had even more basic objections to the whole idea of search and seizure.
He noted that:
[T]he nature of the right of search at sea ... , as recognized or tolerated by the usage
of nations, is a right exclusively of war, never exercised but by an outrage upon the
rights of peace. It is an act analogous to that of searching the dwelling-houses of
individuals on the land. The vessel of the navigator is his dwelling-house, and like that,
in the sentiment of every people that cherishes the blessings of personal liberty and
security, ought to be a sanctuary inviolable to the hand of power, unless upon the most
unequivocal public necessity, and under the most rigorous personal responsibility of the
intruder. Search at sea, as recognized by all maritime nations, is confmed to the single
object of finding and taking contraband of war. By the law of nature, when two nations
conflict together in war, a third, remaining neutral, retains all its rights of peace and
friendly intercourse with both. Each belligerent, indeed, acquires by war the right of
preventing a third party from administering to his enemy the direct and immediate
materials of war; and, as incidental to this right, that of searching the merchant vessels
of the neutral on the high seas to fmd them. Even thus limited, it is an act of power
which nothing but necessity can justify, inasmuch as it cannot be exercised but by
carrying the evils of war into the abodes of peace, and by visiting the innocent with
some of the penalties of guilt. Among the modern maritime nations, an usage has crept
in, not founded upon the law of nature, never universally admitted, often successfully
resisted, and against which all have occasionally borne testimony by renouncing it in
treaties, of extending this practice of search and seizure to all the property of the enemy
in the vessel of the friend. This practice was, in its origin, evidently an abusive and
wrongful extension of the search for contraband: effected by the belligerent, because
he was armed; submitted to by the neutral, because he was defenseless; and acquiesced
in by his sovereign for the sake of preserving a remnant of peace, rather than become
himself a party to the war. Having thus, occasionally, been practiced by all as
belligerents, and submitted to by all as neutrals, it has acquired the force of an usage
which, at the occurrence of every war, the belligerent may enforce or relinquish, and
which the neutral may suffer or resist, at their respective options.
This search for and seizure of the property of an enemy in the vessel of a friend is
a relic of the barbarous warfare of barbarous ages-the cruel and, for the most part,
now exploded system of private war. As it concerns the enemy himself, it is inconsistent
with ~hat mitigated usage of modern wars which respects the private property of
individuals on the land. As relates to the neutral, it is a violation of his natural right
to pursue, unmolested, his peaceful commercial intercourse with his friend. Invidious
as is its character in both these aspects it has other essential characteristics equally
obnoxious. It is an uncontrolled exercise of authority by a man in arms over a man
without defense-by an officer of one nation over the citizen of another-by a man
intent upon the annoyance of his enemy, responsible for the act of search to no tribunal,
and always prompted to balance the disappointment of a fruitless search by the abusive
exercise of his power, and to punish the neutral for the very clearness of his neutrality.
It has, in short, all the features of unbridled power, stimulated by hostile and unsocial
passions.
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I forbear to enlarge upon the further extension of this practice by referring to injuries
which the United States experienced when neutral in a case ofvital importance; because,
in digesting a plan for the attainment of an object which both nations have equally at
heart, it is desirable to avoid every topic which may excite painful sensations on either
side. I have adverted to the interest in question from necessity, it being one which could
not be lost sight of in the present discussion.
Such being the view taken on the right of search, as recognized by the law of nations
and exercised by belligerent powers, it is due to candor to state that my Government
has an insuperable objection to its extension by treaty, in any manner whatever, lest
it might lead to consequences still more injurious to the United States, and especially
in the circumstance alluded to. That the proposed extension will operate in time of
peace and derive its sanction from compact present no inducements to its adoption. On
the contrary, they form strong objections to it. Every extension of the right of search
on the principles of that right is disapproved. If the freedom of the sea is abridged by
compact for any new purpose the example may lead to other changes. And ifits operation
is extended to a time of peace, as well as of war, a new system will be commenced
for the dominion of the sea, which may eventually, especially by the abuses into which
it may lead, confound all distinction of time and circumstances, of peace and of war,
and of rights applicable to each state.I5

In 1824, a British-American treaty was drafted based on a proposal made
by then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who took into account the
fact that both countries had enacted laws declaring the slave trade to be piracy
punishable by death,16 as well as a resolution of the United States Congress
requesting the President to conduct negotiations leading to the ultimate
denunciation of the slave trade "as piracy under the law of nations, by the
consent of the civilized world. "17
The 1824 Treaty declared that the right to visit and search, reciprocally
conceded, is wholly and exclusively founded on the consideration that the
two nations have by their laws made the slave trade piracy, and that each
power shall use its influence with all other civilized powers, to procure from
them the acknowledgement that the slave trade is piracy under the law of
nations. To remove United States objections to foreign adjudication the treaty
also provided that a slave trading vessel of one country captured by the naval
vessel of the other should be delivered to a port of the captured vessel's own
country for adjudication. 1s The Senate circumscribed its consent to
ratification with several amendments cutting down United States obligations;
these amendments were rejected by the British Government, and the treaty
had to be abandoned.19
After this attempt to find a compromise came to naught, the situation
deteriorated. In 1839, the British Parliament enacted a law which was
primarily directed against Portuguese vessels, but also applied to vessels "not
being justly entitled to claim the protection of the flag of any state or
nation."2O It authorized their visit to ascertain their nationality; seizing them
not only when slaves were found on board but also if they were equipped
for slave trade (e.g., carrying shackles, handcuffs, extra food and water, and
large boilers for mass cooking); bringing them for adjudication as if they were
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the property of British subjects; granting a bonus ("indemnity") to all persons
concerned in their capture; and protecting the captors from any suit against
them in a British court.21
When this bill was presented to the House of Lords, the Duke of
Wellington, the great British hero who defeated Napoleon in the Battle of
Waterloo, opposed the bill regardless of its laudable objective. He reminded
the lords that "the greatest judge who ever presided over an Admiralty
Court" (Lord Stowell) had laid down in the Le Louis case that in peacetime
even the right of search was illegal and contrary to the law of nations, unless
that right had been conceded by treaty. If British cruisers should start stopping
and searching suspicious ships of other nations, whether a treaty existed or
not, as they had already started doing in relation to some foreign flag ships,
other nations might soon resist or retaliate, and there would be a grave danger
of universal war.22 Wellington's view prevailed, and the House of Lords
rejected the bill; it was, however, adopted on the second reading, after the
Government made sufficient changes in the bill to persuade enough lords to
accept it.23
In 1840, the British Government informed the United States that it could
not allow foreign vessels to protect themselves by a fraudulent use of the
American flag, and instructed the Admiralty to board American flag vessels
suspected of being non-American for the restricted purpose of examining their
papers and ascertaining whether they were actually entitled to display the
American flag. If these papers were in order, the vessel would have to be
immediately released; if they were not in order, it would be permissible to
search the vessel; and if it had slaves on board or was equipped for slave
trading, it would have to be detained and sent to the appropriate port for
trial. The Admiralty's orders made it clear that American vessels must be
shown every possible courtesy when boarded, but no one should be allowed
to refuse inspection, and force might be used if necessary.:zlI
After the United States protested the boarding of American flag vessels,
Lord Palmers ton, the British Foreign Secretary, explained that "the right
existed of ascertaining in some way or another the character of the vessel,
and that by her papers and not the colours on flag, which might be displayed, "
and that such inspection of papers "could not be regarded as amounting to
a right of search." In reply, the United States ambassador, Mr. Stevenson,
made clear that "under no circumstances could the government of the United
States consent to the exercise of the right on the part of any foreign nations,
to interrupt, board, or search their vessels on the high seas." He added that
"to admit the right of a foreign naval officer, to decide upon the genuineness
of American vessels, by boarding them . . . was in effect allowing the right
of search, and therefore utterly indefensible. "25
The difference of views on the right of visit was ingeniously papered over
in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which dealt with a number of
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important British-American disputes. It provided for sending two squadrons,
one British and one American, to West Africa to suppress, separately but
in concert and cooperation, the slave trade.26 It was understood that the main
duty of the American squadron would be to ascertain, in case of doubt, the
right of a vessel to display the American flag, and thus to avoid its visit by
a British warship.27
In order to avoid further conflict, the British Admiralty issued the
following instructions to the Navy:
The Slave Trade has been denounced by all the civilized world as repugnant to every
principle ofjustice and humanity. You are, however, to bear in mind, that Great Britain
claims no rights whatever with respect to foreign ships engaged in that traffic, excepting
such as the Law of Nations warrants, or as she possesses by special Treaties and
Conventions with particular states.
It is your duty to make yourself thoroughly conversant with the Treaties, Conventions,
and Laws, as well as with all the Instructions given to you relative to the Slave Trade.
You are not to visit a vessel under a Foreign flag on the High Seas on suspicion of
the Slave Trade, except in virtue of special authority under Treaty, or in case you have
reason to believe that the vessel has no right to title to claim the protection of the flag
she bears ...
Towards every functionary, British or Foreign, with whom you may come in contact,
you will invariably maintain a respectful and courteous demeanour.
You will take special care to ensure propriety of language and demeanour on the
part of officers, seamen and marines, towards all persons (officers being held responsible
for any 'exhibition of intemperance' on the part of those under their command}.28

Nevertheless, other incidents occurred, and in 1852 Secretary of State Cass
reopened the controversy by notifying the British Government that the
United States denied "the right of cruisers of any other power whatever,
for any purpose whatever, to enter their vessels by force in time of
peace .... No change of name can change the illegal character of the
assumption. Search, or visit, it is equally an assault upon the independence
of nations. "29 When the British Government asked the law officers of the
Crown for their opinion on this subject, they responded that the United States
was right in its interpretation of international law, and that an American
vessel could be boarded by British officers only at their own risk.
Consequently, British cruisers were ordered "to respect the American flag
under any circumstances."30
President Lincoln, upon taking office, immediately authorized Secretary
of State Seward to start negotiations with the British Government on a
convention to suppress the slave trade. These negotiations terminated in April
of 1862 by the conclusions of a detailed convention, which authorized the
ships of the two navies to "visit such merchant vessels of the two nations
as may, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the African
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Slave Trade, or having been fitted for that purpose; or of having, during the
voyage on which they are met by the said cruisers, been engaged in the
American Slave Trade, contrary to the provisions of this Treaty. " The means
of the search were carefully specified in the treaty, and it was made clear
that "the only object of the search is to ascertain whether the vessel is
employed in African Slave Trade, or is fitted up for the said Trade." The
right to search was originally limited to the distance of 200 miles from the
coast of Africa, southward of the 32nd parallel of north latitude, and within
30 leagues of the coast of Cuba; later it was extended to the area within 30
leagues of Madagascar, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo.
The two governments agreed to establish three Mixed Courts of Justice,
formed of an equal number of individuals from both countries; their seats
were to be at Sierra Leone, Cape of Good Hope and New York. Each captured
ship was to be brought before one of these courts and, if condemned, was
to be broken up (to avoid its later sale to another slave trader); the master
and crew of any condemned vessel were to be punished according to the laws
of the country to which such vessel belonged, and should ordinarily be
delivered for the execution of that punishment to the nation under whose
flag the condemned vessel was sailing; and punishment was also to be meted
to the owners of the condemned vessel and the persons interested in her
equipment or cargo unless they should be able to prove that they had no
participation in the enterprise. The enslaved Africans found on board of a
condemned vessel were to be placed at the disposal of the Government whose
cruiser had made the capture; they were to be set free immediately, the
Government to whom they had been delivered guaranteeing their liberty.
Should the Mixed Court ofJustice decide, however, that the cruiser was guilty
of an arbitrary and illegal detention, the cruiser's Government would be
obligated to make good any losses suffered by the subjects or citizens of the
other country, such indemnification to be paid within one year from the
Court's decision. If one Government should complain that a navy officer of
the other country had deviated from the stipulations of the Treaty, his
government would be bound to institute an inquiry and to inflict upon the
officer, if found guilty of willful transgression, a punishment proportionate
to the transgression. 31
By the end of the 1860s, the slave trade diminished greatly, and Congress
asked for the abolition of the Mixed Courts of Justice in order to cut
unnecessary expenditures.32 These courts were terminated in 1870, and their
jurisdiction was transferred to national courts competent to deal with
maritime prizes. Any American vessel captured by a British cruiser was to
be sent for adjudication to New York or Key West, whichever should be
more accessible, or was to be handed over to a United States cruiser, if one
should be available in the neighborhood of the capture; similarly, a British
vessel captured by an American cruiser was to be sent for adjudication to
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the nearest or most accessible British colony, or was to be handed over to
a British cruiser, if one should be available in the neighborhood of capture.
All enslaved Africans on board either an American or British vessel were
to be handed over to the nearest British authority, to be immediately set free
and guaranteed liberty by the British Government. If some of them had to
be sent with the detained vessel as necessary witnesses, they were to be set
free as soon as their testimony should no longer be required and their liberty
was to be guaranteed.33 This ambitious treaty ended the American-British
debate about visit and search, but it had little practical effect as the slave
trade across the Atlantic came to an end at about the same time as a result
of Brazil's change of attitude and its willingness to take effective action
against importation of slaves.34
The work of the abolitionists was not yet finished. In the meantime, there
was an increase in slave traffic from East Africa across the Indian Ocean,
which led in 1888 to the renewal of the debate about the right of visit and
search between, on the one hand, Great Britain and Germany, who were
supposedly helping the Sultan of Zanzibar to blockade the coast, and, on the
other hand, France. In addition, problems arose between Great Britain and
Germany, which dealt harshly with captured vessels, their crews, and even
the liberated cargo.35
When the Brussels conference on the affairs of Africa was convened by
King Leopold II of Belgium in 1889, the British Government made sure that
the issue of terminating maritime slave traffic would be on the agenda, and
proposed a general agreement to establish a specific slave trade zone within
which the signatory powers would have the "right of supervision, jointly and
severally, whether on high seas or in territorial waters, over all sailing vessels
under any flag."36 The proposal was to be implemented by bringing the
captured slavers before mixed tribunals representing at least five of the
signatory powers; by turning the offenders over to their own national
authorities for punishment under their own laws, which would provide for
severe penalties; and by establishing international offices to exchange
information not only about the slave trade but also about ships authorized
to fly each national flag and the sentences passed on slavers.37
The French Government responded with a proposal which allowed
inspection within a more limited zone of only indigenous vessels for the sole
purpose of verifying the flag. It required, in case of doubt about a vessel's
right to fly a particular flag, that the investigation be handed over to the
flag nation. It provided for returning the vessel to the captor if it was not
entitled to fly the flag it claimed, and imposed compensation for wrongful
arrest, to be settled, in case of a dispute, by an international tribuna1. 38
The Russian jurist, Frederic de Martens, was given the task of preparing
a compromise solution, and his proposal became chapter III of the General
Act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, signed at Brussels on July
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2, 1890.39 It provided for more effective repression of the slave trade in the
maritime zone of the Indian Ocean extending from south of Madagascar to
Persia {Iran} in the north, and including the Red Sea and the Persian {Arab}
Gulf. The surveillance was to be limited to native vessels whose tonnage was
less than 500 tons. A warship of any signatory power, having reason to believe
that a vessel of such tonnage, navigating within the specified zone, was
engaged in the slave trade or was guilty of the fraudulent use of a flag, was
entitled only to examine the ship's papers; any further search or calling the
roll of the crew and passengers was only authorized when permitted by a
prior convention for suppression of the slave trade concluded by the flag state
of the vessel. Should the acts of supervision permitted by the treaty or
convention convince the naval officer in command of the cruiser that
irrefutable proofs existed of fraudulent use of the flag or participation in the
slave trade, he had to bring the arrested vessel to the nearest port of the zone
where there was a competent magistrate of the flag state of that vessel or
to turn it over to a cruiser of that vessel's nationality, if the latter consented
to take charge of it. If the investigation by the magistrate proved that the
flag was fraudulently used, the vessel would be put at the disposal of the
captor. If slaves should be found on board or any other offense connected
with the slave trade was proven, the vessel and cargo would remain
sequestered in charge of the magistrate who had conducted the investigation
until the vessel had been properly condemned and transferred to the captor,
or declared innocent and permitted to continue on its course. The slaves were
to be liberated by the local authority and either returned home or settled
on the spot. If the vessel was illegally arrested, an indemnity had to be fixed
by the magistrate in proportion to the damage suffered by the vessel being
taken out of its course. If the officer of the capturing vessel disagreed as to
the amount of the indemnity the matter had to be immediately submitted
to arbitration. The captain and the crew of the vessel condemned for an
offense were to be brought promptly before a tribunal of the nation whose
flag had been used by the accused or to a specially commissioned authority
of that nation.
The main antagonists were satisfied with the final text. The British
Government received the right to visit all likely slave-carrying vessels within
the zone, and French vessels were freed from visit and search outside the
zone. 40 Nevertheless, the French Chamber of Deputies refused to accept the
provisions relating to the verification of the flag, and to preserve the treaty
France was allowed to exclude these clauses in its ratification document. 41
In consequence, the apparent consensus disintegrated and a shadow was
thrown again on the right of visit and search.
By the end of the 19th century, the measures taken under the Brussels Act
contributed to the almost complete abolition of the slave trade, though it
survived under various guises in a few places throughout the 20th century.42
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In revising the map of the world after the First World War, the victors decided
to get rid of the cumbersome anti-slavery provisions of the Brussels Act, and
replaced them as between the parties to one of the Saint-Germain Conventions
of 1919, by a provision which merely contained a general statement that the
parties will endeavor "to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all
its forms and of the black slave trade by land and sea. "43
In 1925, the British Government proposed to the League of Nations the
adoption of a convention implementing the general provision of the 1919
convention. It suggested strong enforcement measures including a provision
that "[ t ]he act of conveying slaves on the high seas shall be deemed to be
an act of piracy, and the public ships of the signatory powers shall have the
same rights in relation to vessels and persons engaged in such act as over vessels
and persons engaged in piracy." It also would have provided for a decision
by the courts and according to the laws of the country of the captor with
respect to the validity of the capture of the vessel and the liberation of slaves,
but for handing over of the persons engaged in the act of conveying slaves
on the high seas to the authorities of their own country which was to bring
them before its court.
In view of a strong opposition to these proposals, the special committee
to which this matter was referred limited the provision in Article 3, paragraph
2, of the 1926 Convention on the Suppression of Slave Trade and Slavery to
an undertaking to negotiate a convention based on an agreement concluded
in 1925 relating to international trade in arms, which, in turn, contained
enforcement provisions similar to those of the 1890 Brussels Act, including
restrictions to native vessels of limited size, special zones, the right to verify
the nationality of the suspected vessel, and the authorities entitled to decide
about the illegality of the trade. 44 Article 3, paragraph 3, of the 1926
Convention also authorized the parties to it "to conclude between themselves,
. without, however, derogating from the principles laid down in the preceding
paragraph, such special agreements as, by reason of their peculiar situation,
might appear suitable in order to bring about as soon as possible the complete
disappearance of the slave trade." Neither these special agreements nor the
supplementary convention envisaged in paragraph 2 of the Article have,
however, been concluded, and the British effort was sidetracked again. 45
After a lapse of almost thirty years, the indomitable British diplomats tried
again, taking advantage of a 1951 report of the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on Slavery which complained that the then existing arrangements
for suppressing slave trade at sea were less satisfactory then those of the 1890
Brussels Act. They suggested the preparation of a convention which would
supplement the 1926 Convention by declaring slave trading on the high seas
to be a "crime similar to piracy in international law," and subjecting slave
trading to the same treatment and punishment as piracy.46 The British
Government presented such a draft convention in 1954. It contained provisions
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similar to those presented by it in 1925. It proposed to make slave trade
equivalent to piracy, but instead of the detailed provisions relating to capture
and legal proceedings against the vessel and the crews, it merely proposed
that the "[p]ublic vessels under the control of parties to this Convention shall
have the same rights in relation to vessels engaged in [the act of conveying
slaves on the high seas or slave-raiding] as they have in relation to vessels
and persons engaged in acts of piracy. "47 A Drafting Committee appointed
by the Economic and Social Council revised the British draft several times,
and prepared a more elaborate article making clear that the provisions relating
to the slave trade would apply only to specified areas of the Indian Ocean,
and added a provision authorizing warships or military aircraft to exercise
the same rights of visit, search and seizure in relation to vessels "suspected
on reasonable grounds of being engaged in the act of conveying slaves as they
have in relation to vessels so suspected of being engaged in acts of piracy. "
It limited the enforcement to vessels of parties to the proposed Convention,
and a proposal to extend it to "stateless vessels" was withdrawn. 48 At the
Conference held in 1956 to adopt the convention, strong opposition was
expressed to the provisions relating to visit, search, and seizure by foreign
warships. A more limited draft restricted to visit and search, and leaving
further action to the flag state, was also rejected. 49 Consequently, the 1956
Convention leaves the enforcement completely in the hands of the flag state.
It requires only that states take effective measures to prevent the transport
of slaves by ships and aircraft and to "punish persons guilty of such acts or
of using a national flag for the purpose. " They must also exchange information
to ensure practical coordination of measures for combating the slave trade.
It is also provided that "[a]ny slave who takes refuge on board any vessel
of the State Party to this Convention shall ipso facto be free."so
During the 1950s, in the context of the codification of the international
law of the sea, the International Law Commission also encountered the
question of the scope of the rule relating to the right to visit and search foreign
vessels on the high seas. Its rapporteur, Professor J. P. A. Francois, in his first
report stated that the" only police measure [on the high seas] allowed in time
of peace is the right of approach, that is to say the right to ascertain the identity
and nationality of the vessel, but not the right to check nationality by
examination of ship's papers, and not, a fortiori, the right of search." After
noting the British efforts to establish "the legality, if not of boarding foreign
merchant vessels, at any rate of the verification of the flag," he pointed out
that wireless telegraphy had almost eliminated the various reasons for which
formerly vessels were induced to make material contact with each other on
the high seas. 51
In his second report, Professor Francois stuck to his position with respect
to the main principle, but added three clarifications. Acts of interference may
be allowed by a treaty; boarding and further action may be justified, if "there
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is a reasonable ground for suspecting that the vessel is engaged in piracy;"
and, if suspicion of piracy should "prove to be unfounded and should the
stopped vessel not have given by unjustified acts any ground for suspicion,
the vessel shall be compensated for any loss due to stoppage. "52
In view of concurrent discussions in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee
on Slavery,53 Professor Francois suggested that some special provisions on
slave trade might be included in the International Law Commission's draft.
He rejected, however, the proposal that slave trade be regarded as an act
of piracy, permitting the stoppage and search of any vessel suspected of
engaging in such a trade by any warship and taking it to a port of the captor
for trial there by national courts. He pointed out the following differences
between piracy and slave trade:
Part at least of the ground for internationalizing the crime of piracy is that the acts
occur on the high seas and that in many cases there are no relations between the pirate
and a given country. The slave trade, on the other hand, takes place between two given
countries. Since both these countries are bound to cooperate in repressing the slave trade,
internationalization- meaning that the vessel may be conducted to any port for trial
by the local courts-does not appear appropriate.

He considered also that the right of control in this case should be limited
to small vessels below a specified tonnage, and should not extend to the whole
area of the high seas but to a limited area only where slave trade is still carried
on, by analogy to the Berlin Act of 1890.54 Finally, he made clear that a visit
of a suspected vessel should be restricted to an examination of its papers, that
examination of the cargo or search of the vessel is permissible only when,
and to the extent, authorized by a convention to which the vessel's flag state
is a party, that trial should be by the courts of the flag state of the captured
vessel, and that in case of illegal arresl an indemnity would have to be paid. 55
During the discussion of his report by the International Law Commission,
Professor Francois pointed out that while old types of slavery were
disappearing, the concept of slavery was being widened, thus threatening that
vessels would be boarded "at all times and in all places," and increasing the
hesitancy of states to accept the right of approach. When die prohibition of
slavery and slave trade by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights56 was
invoked in order to justify the exercise of the right of approach "everywhere
in respect of vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade," Francois
replied that "[ t]o recognize that the slave trade was prohibited was one thing,
to recognize the right of approach was another."57
The Commission decided in 1951 that in the interests of stamping out the
slave trade, the right of approach to ships ~ngaged in the slave trade "should
be put on the same footing as in the case of piracy, and hence should be
permissible without regard to zone or tonnage."58 Consequently, Professor
Francois submitted the following proposal to the Commission concerning the
right of approach, designed to safeguard the freedom of navigation and to
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prohibit, except in clearly defined cases, the boarding and inspection of ships
on the high seas:
Except where acts of interference are done under powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters a foreign merchant vessel at sea is not justified in boarding
her or in taking any further action unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that
the vessel is engaged in piracy or in the slave trade. Should such suspicions prove to
be unfounded and should the stopped vessel not have given by unjustified acts any ground
for suspicion, the vessel shall be compensated for any loss due to the stoppage. 59

In addition, he proposed the following separate article emphasizing the duty
to cooperate in measures for the repression of the slave trade:
All States are required to cooperate for the more effective repression of the slave
trade. They undertake to adopt efficient measures to prevent the transport of slaves
on vessels authorized to fly their colours and to prevent the unlawful use of their flag
for the purpose.
Any slave who has taken refuge on board a ship of war or a merchant vessel shall
be ipso facto set free. 60

Similar provisions on slave trade were included in the rapporteur's 1954 report
and in the Commission's 1955 text. The 1954-55 texts contained also, for the
first time, more elaborate provisions on piracy.61 New difficulties did arise,
however, with respect to the right-of-approach proposal. At the 1955 session
of the Commission, Professor Scelle revived the traditional distinction
between the right to verify the flag and the right to board and search, and
pointed out that the existing situation was dangerous as the "exercise of the
right of verification could easily, and almost imperceptibly, become an act
of boarding and searching;" that it "was the thin edge of the wedge;" and
that "such possibility should be guarded against." As a remedy he suggested
that "verification should take place on board the investigating warship."62
In reply, Professor Francois explained that "the problem of the policing of
the high seas was both complex and difficult." He pointed out that:
It was generally accepted that warships had the right to demand that merchant vessels
at sea should show their flag upon request. Such a request for identification was perfectly
natural, because it was not the usual practice for merchant vessels continually to fly
their flags at sea. It was also widely recognized that, if the merchant vessel refused
to show her flag or gave an evasive reply, the warships had the right to investigate
her identity. That, again, was an essential condition for the control of piracy....
Sanctions for unjustified verification had previously been provided in the form of
damages, the award of which was to be made by one of two methods. The first, and
more severe, was that whereby, if the suspicion proved to be unfounded, compensation
must be rendered for any loss due to the stoppage. The second, and less stringent,
provided for compensation to be paid ifit could be shown that the vessel had been stopped
for insufficient reason. He had chosen the first of those alternatives because of the
liability to abuse in the application of the second owing to the difficulty of judging
motives.
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He opposed, however, the proposal that verification should take place on
board the investigating warship, stressing "the danger in even a moderate
sea of carrying the ship papers-the loss of which would be a most serious
matter-to and from the investigating warship in a small open boat." With
some exceptions, the practice of investigation on board the merchant vessel
has been followed since 1659.63
Professor Scelle insisted, however, that the need to verify the flag goes
far beyond piracy and slave trade, is essential for the general policing of the
seas in view of the fraudulent practices in the registration of ships and the
need to determine responsibility for any damage done by merchant vessels
on the high seas by violating general rules on navigation or pollution. He
added later that "it was as important to prevent ships from sailing under false
colours as it was to suppress slavery and piracy."
This view was opposed by several members of the Commission who wanted
the right to verify a vessel's flag restricted to piracy and slave trade. The
Scelle proposal for a general right of flag verification was rejected by a vote
of 6 to 2, with 2 abstentions. 64 The rapporteur accepted more easily the
suggestion that a warship should be allowed to board a foreign-flag vessel
if there was a reasonable ground to suspect that the vessel was in fact of the
same nationality as the warship. It was generally recognized also that a
warship can verify the flag of merchant vessels flying the same flag as the
warship, and can seize it and bring to a port of the flag state for punishment
if the vessel was flying the flag without authority.6S
Another controversy arose with respect to the right to visit and search a
vessel when a warship has reason to suspect it of engaging, "during times
of imminent peril to the security of the State, in activities hostile to the State
of the warship."66 This proposal was supported on the basis of the general
principle of self-defense, but it was objected that this principle cannot be
applied to boarding a vessel on the high seas on mere suspicion that it was
threatening the security of a state, as such "exception to the principle of the
freedom of navigation might destroy that freedom altogether, since States
would tend to invoke the argument of legitimate defense to justify any act
of interference. "67 As a result of that discussion, the Commission's comment
to the article on the right of visit explained that the Commission found it
inadvisable to provide for the right to board a vessel being suspected of
committing acts hostile to the state to which the warship belongs, at a time
of imminent danger to the security of that state, as there was a danger of
abuse because of the vagueness of terms like "imminent danger" and "hostile
acts. "68
The draft of text and comments approved by the Commission in 1955 was
only slightly changed in 1956, when the Commission adopted the final report
for the Law of the Sea Conference. In this report the Commission extended
the right to visit also to the situation where there is reasonable ground for
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suspecting that "while flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the
vessel is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship." The Commission
explained that in this case "it can be presumed that the vessel has committed
unlawful acts and the warship should be at liberty to verify whether its
suspicions are justified." At the same time, the Commission limited the
boarding of ships suspected of slavery to maritime zones treated as suspect
in the international conventions for the abolition of slave trade, in order to
ensure that the right of control would not be used as a pretext for exercising
the right of visit in waters where the slave trade would not normally be
expected to exist.69
At the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, the provisions on slave trade were
strongly attacked by delegations of several African and Eastern European
states. For instance, Mr. Ben Salem (Tunisia) argued that:
No state had the right to police the high seas. No state had the right to interfere with
the ships of another State on the high seas. The provisions relating to the slave trade
and piracy were of purely historical interest. The provision regarding action based on
a suspicion that a ship was engaged in the slave trade should not be used as a pretext
for inspecting a ship when there was no warrant for such suspicion. Warships, although
they had the right to determine what flag a foreign ship was flying, did not have the
right to determine whether it had the right to fly the flag, or a fortiori, the right to visit
the ship. Unfortunately, the fears he was voicing on the subject were justified by a
number of acts of interference which had been committed recently ... [C]ertain states
had arrogated to themselves the right to inspect and detain ships of other states on the
high seas as if they owned the high seas. Such an act was an infringement of the law
and a violation of the principle of the freedom of the seas. 70

Mr. El Erian (United Arab Republic, later Egypt) considered that there
was no justification for a provision allowing warships to board ships suspected
of engaging in slave trade in certain maritime zones specified in the 1890 Act
of Brussels. While such provision had perhaps been justified in the nineteenth
century, conditions had changed since, as was recognized in the 1919, 1926,
and 1956 conventions on abolition of slavery which contained no such
provisions. Such a provision "was objectionable and a potential source of
disputes. ''71 Egypt proposed, therefore, the deletion of the provision presented
by the International Law Commission.72 Mr. Keilin (Soviet Union) supported
such deletion for several reasons:
In the first place, would it not be discriminatory automatically to regard certain maritime
zones as suspect in the matter of the slave trade? It was well known which countries
had warships cruising in those neighbourhoods and had interests which would be served
by the right of visit thus established. Secondly, it was inadmissible and unjustified to
presume that ships in the "suspect" zones were engaged in the slave trade; such a
suspicion would probably only be a pretext for controlling maritime trade in violation
of the principle of the freedom of the high seas. Thirdly, the sub-paragraph was in no
way necessary for effectively combating the slave trade, and it seemed that the
International Law Commission had allowed itself to be influenced by happenings in a
former age in an entirely different set of circumstances, of which the memory lay
sleeping in the dust of archives. Finally, the provision ran counter to the Supplementary
Convention on Slavery of 1956, article 3 of which laid down that the transport or
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attempted transport of slaves from one country to another was a penal offence and that
persons found guilty of such offences were liable to severe penalties. The suppression
of such offences could and should be undertaken by the States of which the flag was
flown by the ships attempting to engage in the transport of slaves.73

The Egyptian amendment was defeated in the Second Committee of the
Law of the Sea Conference by 22 votes to 16, with 11 abstentions. 74 One of
the abstainers was Ghana, which objected primarily to the restriction of the
right to board ships suspected of slave trade to a specific region. Its delegation
preferred a provision that would allow the boarding of "ships suspected of
slaving wherever they might be. "75 The idea was revived at the time of the
final vote in the plenary meeting of the Conference, where South Africa
proposed the deletion of the reference to the maritime zones suspected of
slave trade, as a counterproposal to the proposal by the United Arab Republic
and Saudi Arabia to completely delete the provision granting the right to
board ships suspected of slave trade. The South African proposal was approved
by 32 votes to 25, with 15 abstentions, and the other proposal was withdrawn.
The right to board article was then approved by 62 votes to none with 9
abstentions. 76
As a result of these developments the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,77
which-according to its preamble-is "generally declaratory of established
principles of intemationallaw," contains eight elaborate articles on piracy,
a general article concerning national measures to prevent and punish the
transport of slaves, and an article allowing boarding of foreign merchant
vessels on the high seas in three specified cases.
One of the piracy articles is the only article which provides expressly for
the seizure of the pirate vessel or aircraft, the arrest of the persons and a
decision of all issues by the court of the state of the warship that captured
the private ship or aircraft. Article 19 provides, in particular, as follows:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 13 imposes on each state the following general obligation with
respect to the maritime slave trade:
Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves
in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship whatever its flag, shall, ipso facto,
be free.

Finally, Article 22 authorizes the following minimal rights of interference
with foreign ships on the high seas:
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1. Except where acts ofinterference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship
which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality,
of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the warship may
proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under
the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents
have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which
must be carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that
may have been sustained.

The corresponding articles of the: 1982 Law of the Sea Convention78 contain
only minor changes. Article 99, now entitled "Prohibition of the transport
of slaves," and Article 105, now entitled "Seizure of private ship or aircraft,"
repeat word for word Articles 13 and 19 of the High Seas Convention. Only
a few changes were made in Article 110 on the "Right to visit," which
corresponds to Article 22 on the High Seas Convention. In the text of Article
110, which follows, the changes and additions have been highlighted:
1. Except where acts ofinterference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship
which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity
in accordance with Articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State ofthe warship has jurisdiction
under Article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality,
of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's
right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer
to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it
may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out
with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that
may have been sustained.

4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
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5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service.

It may be noted that the 1958 text deals only with the interference by a
warship with a "foreign merchant ship" on the high seas. It does not apply
to an encounter between two warships, or between a warship and a
government ship operated only for non-commercial purposes.79 This last point
was made more explicit in the new text, which makes it clear that a foreign
ship can be boarded in the specified limited circumstances only if it is "other
than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and
96," namely, if it is a warship (Article 95) or a ship "owned or operated by
a State and used only on government non-commercial service."
While the "warship" that is permitted to interfere is narrowly defined in
the 1958 Convention as a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State, properly
marked as such, commanded by a duly commissioned naval officer and manned
by a crew under regular naval discipline,so the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea permits action under Article 110 to be taken also by a military
aircraft, as well as "duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service. "SI Thus, even though it might
have been doubtful whether the Coast Guard was entitled to act under the
1958 Convention, it has a clear right to take action under the 1982 Convention
provisions to the extent that they are generally accepted as rules of customary
internationallaw. 82
The 1958 and 1982 Conventions have broadened in two ways the field of
applicability of the 1890 General Act of Berlin: their provisions are applicable
to all vessels, not as previously only to vessels of less than 500 tons; and they
are applicable to all the oceans, not only to a small part of the Indian Ocean
and its subsidiary seas and gulfs. 83
Finally it should be noted that originally there were only two grounds for
stopping a foreign ship, namely the existence of reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy or slave trade. Later, the case
was added of a ship suspected of concealing the fact that it was of the same
nationality as the warship. The 1982 Convention went two steps further,
adding ships suspected of being "without nationality," and-under strong
pressure by Western European countries-ships suspected of engaging in
unauthorized broadcasting. 84 In the latter case, only warships of three
categories of countries and two specific groups of countries were allowed
to board such ships, namely, those of the flag State of the ship; the State of
registration of a high seas installation; the State of which the person engaged
'" in broadcasting is a national; any State where the transmissions can be
received; or any State where authorized radio communication is suffering
interference. 85 While illegal broadcasting belongs clearly to a special
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category, it was included because of the existence of the European regional
convention on the subject. 86
The question of control over stateless vessels arose several times in previous
discussions, especially after the controversial British law of 1839,87 and more
recently at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, where the subject
became complicated by the fear that a warship might be able to stop any
vessel on the high seas by claiming that the vessel is stateless because there
was no genuine link between the vessel and the flag state.88 The inclusion
of the right to board stateless vessels in the 1982 Convention was due to the
general acceptance of the proposition that it was dangerous to have ships
sailing on the high seas which were not subject to the jurisdiction of any State,
and being law unto themselves did not comply with any generally accepted
international regulations to ensure safety at sea. Consequently, the rule was
adopted that such a ship can be stopped by any warship and dealt with
according to the law of the warship's State. 89 It is not clear what would happen
if the examination should show that the stopped ship has complied with all
international regulations and there was no valid reason for interfering with
its navigation. In any case, the persons on board the ship should be treated
in accordance with the internationally recognized human rights, and if they
have not been found engaged in any illegal activity, their basic "right to life,
liberty and the security of person" should be recognized. 90 Unless these
persons are also stateless, they may be entitled to the protection of the State
of their nationality regardless of the fact that they are travelling on a stateless
vessel.91 Even if they are stateless, they are entitled to basic human rights. 92
An additional complication is caused by the provisions in the 1958
Convention on the High Seas and of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
which establish the rule that a "ship which sails under the flags of two or
more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the
nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be
assimilated to a ship without nationality. "93 Some states have considered this
provision as a license to treat such a ship and its crew in any way they please,
forgetting their obligations under international law of human rights. In
particular, the rules about equal treatment and non-discrimination are
applicable to the persons on these ships, and regardless of the place in which
the alleged crime was committed they are entitled to be protected against
governmental violations of internationally recognized human rights. 94

III. Campaign Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
There is another important difference between the 1958 and 1982
Conventions. While the 1958 Convention on the High Seas contained no
provision on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, the 1958 Convention on the
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Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone had a limited provision on the subject
in Article 19, which read as follows:
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coast~l State should not be exercised on board a

foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its
passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order
of the territorial sea; or
(c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the
ship or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State'to take any steps
authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the coastal State shall,
if the captain so requests, advise the consular authority of the flag State before taking
any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such authority and the ship's crew. In
cases of emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being
taken.
4. In considering whether or how an arrest should be made, the local authorities shall
pay due regard to the interests of navigation.
5. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a foreign ship passing through
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection
with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship,
proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without
entering internal waters. 95

This convention thus authorized the coastal states to arrest any person or
to conduct any investigation on board a foreign ship passing through their
territorial sea, ifit is necessary for "the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs," subject to conditions specified in paragraphs 3 and 5, and paying" due
regard to the interests of navigation" (paragraph 4).
This provision can be traced to a more limited suggestion of the
International Law Commission, that was due to an initiative of the
Government of Israel which called to the attention of the Commission the
fact that its draft on the regime of the territorial sea contained no mention
of the right of the coastal state to take steps to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs. 96 In 1956, at the last session of the Commission devoted to the law
of the sea, Professor Francois, the Rapporteur of the Commission on the
regime of the territorial sea, was asked whether a reference on this subject
should be added in the text of the article relating to the arrest on board a
foreign vessel in the territorial sea. He replied that the paragraph allowing
coastal state action if the consequences of a criminal act extended beyond
the vessel would almost always apply to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 97

Sohn

61

The final report of the Commission added a sentence in the commentary to
Article 20, stating that an "arrest for the purposes of suppressing illicit traffic
in narcotic drugs may be justifiable, if the condition in sub-paragraph (a) is
fulfilled," i.e., if "the consequences of the crime extend beyond the ship. "98
At the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea the issue was revived by
Pakistan, which proposed the addition of a sub-paragraph in Article 20, which
would allow the coastal state, in certain specified circumstances, to arrest
a person on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea, "[i]f it
is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. "99
The First Committee of the Conference adopted this proposal by 33 votes
to 8, with 30 abstentions, after a short discussion. lOO On the one hand, it was
argued by the representative of Turkey that this proposal dealt with an issue
of such importance that the proposal should be broadened; it should not be
limited to the territorial sea as "the question of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
was of universal concern. "101 On the other hand, some delegates thought that
this addition was not necessary, as it was covered by other subparagraphs
of Article 20, relating to the right of arrest if "the consequence of the crime
extend beyond the ship," or "the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of
the country or the good order of the territorial sea. "102 The representative
of Norway doubted whether such provision would assist in suppressing illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs, as "it was difficult to imagine cases where crimes
of the kind envisaged in the Pakistan proposal would actually have been
committed on the ship during its passage." He also noted that the proposed
text would enable the coastal state to detain and search ships on mere
suspicion, causing delays and derogating considerably from the right of
innocent passage. He suggested that a "coastal State which had good reason
to suspect that a ship passing through the territorial sea was being used for
purposes of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs would be better advised to alert
the ship's first port of call, where appropriate action could be taken.103
Article 20 of the Territorial Sea Convention with only minor drafting
changes became Article 27 of the 1982 Law of the Sea C.onvention. In
particular, the provision relating to narcotic drugs was changed slightly,
allowing arrest of any person on board or an investigation, if "such measures
are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances. "104
Although the 1958 Convention on the High Seas contained no provision
on narcotic drugs, a basic provision on the subject was included in Article
108 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. No complementary
provision was included, however, in Article 110 relating to the right of visit.
This is especially surprising in view of the fact that the other new 1982 version,
the one relating to unauthorized broadcasting-discussed above-is followed
up by listing that activity as one of those justifying boarding a suspected vessel.
In addition, Article 109, paragraph 4, makes clear that anyone of the states
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specified in that article "may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person
or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting
apparatus." There are no parallel provisions with respect to illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs.
It has to be noted, however, that during the drafting of Articles 108 and
109 suggestions were made for strengthening these provisions for the control
of illegal traffic in narcotic drugs. The United Kingdom delegation, true to
its tradition of support for the policing of the high seas, suggested in 1974
that the convention on the law of the sea should contain provisions with regard
to ships found trafficking in narcotics. lOS A draft was soon presented which,
in addition to language that, with minor changes, became the text of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 108 of the Convention, contained the following
proposal:
Any state which has reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel is engaged in illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs may, whatever the nationality of the vessel but provided that
its tonnage is less than 500 tons, seize the illicit cargo. The State which carried out
this seizure shall inform the State of nationality of the vessel in order that the latter
State may institute proceedings against those responsible for the illicit traffic.

This proposal was included in this form in the Second Committee's basic
compilation of proposals expressing the "main trends" at the Conference on
a particular topic, together with a suggestion that a reference to psychotropic
substances should be added in appropriate places.106 Nevertheless, when the
Chairman of the Second Committee prepared in 1975 the first "informal single
negotiating text," he included the two other paragraphs in Article 94 of his
text, but omitted the clause allowing the seizure of illegal cargo by any state,
and providing for the punishment by the flag state of the persons responsible
for the illegal traffic. lo7 The delegation of Peru revived the issue in 1980, when
it recommended both adding in Article 108 a provision on cooperation with
the coastal state in case of seizure of a foreign vessel in that state's exclusive
economic zone by a warship of a third state, and an addition in Article 110
of a provision allowing boarding on the high seas of vessels engaged in the
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.108 Neither of these
proposals was incorporated in the final text.
Consequently, there is no mention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in
Article 110, and Article 108 provides only that:
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international
conventions.
2. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is
engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request the
co-operation of other States to suppress such traffic.

Three issues raised by this provision need to be emphasized. In the first
place, the obligation to "co-operate" is generally considered as a "weak"

Sohn

63

obligation, merely a promissory note, which requires implementation by more
detailed provisions, such as those relating to piracy (1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Articles 101-107) or unauthorized broadcasting (Article 109,
paragraphs 2-4 and 110, paragraph l{c)).
Second, paragraph 2 is carefully restricted. Only the flag state is entitled
to ask other states for co-operation in catching one of its ships, if it has
reasonable grounds for believing that this ship is engaged in illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs. The opposite side is not mentioned-whether another state
is entitled to ask the flag state to allow the boarding of a suspected vessel
sailing under that flag. This is a clear case of "don't call me, I'll call you,"
designed to protect the flag state against finding itself in the unpleasant
situation where it would have to permit boarding, as otherwise it would be
suspected of assisting the drug trafficker. Its right to protect its vessels against
possibly unwarranted interference is thereby destroyed for all practical
purposes. Consequently, instead of a practice of ad hoc arrangements, flag
states are likely to prefer the conclusion in advance of a basic agreement that
would spell out the permitted measures and would provide some guarantee
against possible abuses.1 09
Third, paragraph 1 allows only the suppression of high seas traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which is "contrary to
international conventions. " The obligation to co-operate thus depends on the
content of several conventions relating to such drugs and substances which
have been adopted since 1912.110 These conventions developed a system of
co-operative arrangements for the suppression on illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances through control of manufacture, and of
export and import, of such drugs and substances, exchange of information
on illicit activities, and acceptance of an obligation to punish or extradite
the offenders.
All the previous conventions on the subject were replaced in 1961 by the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,1l1 which in t1;1rn was amended by a
1972 Protocol. 112 This convention improved the system of international control
through strict limitation of manufacture, exports and imports of an increasing
list of drugs. The States Parties to the convention agreed to co-operate closely
in a co-ordinated campaign against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
to assist each other in the campaign;113 they agreed also to punish adequately
the persons involved in such traffic, including those found guilty of intentional
participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, the offenses
(listed in the convention) that were connected with such traffic. 114 It should
be noted, however, that no mention was made of any special co-operation
with respect to any activities at sea, although it was known that a large
proportion of illicit traffic was using ships for smuggling the drugs. The 1972
Protocol strengthened the extradition provisions of the 1961 Convention, but
again was silent on facilitating action against vessels engaged in illicit
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traffic. ll5 Similarly, the parallel prOVlSlons of the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances did not mention enforcement at sea. 116
During the 1970s the United States mounted a comprehensive effort to stem
the increasing flood of illicit drugs into the United States, and developed a
program of interdiction on the high seas of vessels suspected of carrying
narcotics to the United States. To justify the program under international
law, the United States relied sometimes on the analogy to slavery, arguing
that persons addicted to drugs are enslaved both to a dangerous habit and
to the drug traffickers on whom they slavishly depend, willing to do anything
to obtain the drugs needed to satisfy their constant craving for narcotics. ll7
Although the United States was reluctant to utilize the treaty process
envisaged by the introductory phrase in Article 22 of the Convention on the
High Seas and by the parallel provision in Article 110 of the Law of the Sea
Convention, it started concluding informal arrangements with other
countries, especially Latin American ones, which established an informal
procedure for obtaining in each case a permission to board a particular vessel.
A 1980 note by the United States to the United Kingdom describes these
arrangements as follows:
Upon initially intercepting a suspicious vessel the Coast Guard seeks, without boarding
the vessel, to establish its identity and to develop other pertinent information. On the
basis of this information, the government of the claimed or displayed nationality of
registration is contacted to verify the claim or display of nationality. If this claim is
not verified or is otherwise demonstrated to be false, the United States Coast Guard
may then approach the suspected vessel and proceed against it, as if it were a United
States flag vessel, in accordance with the principles relating to stateless vessels embodied
in Articles 6 and 22 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. If, however, the claim
or display of nationality is verified, and absent other facts, a special arrangement must
be entered into with the flag state if the Coast Guard is to be allowed to board, search,
and, if contraband is found seize the foreign flag vessel. Only after an arrangement has
been reached does the United States Coast Guard take action with respect to the
suspected vessel, and then only in strict compliance with the arrangement.
In some cases the government concerned grants the Government of the United States
permission to board, search and, if contraband is found indicating a violation of United
States law, seize the vessel under United States law and take all further actions
concerning the vessel under United States law. Alternatively, some governments grant
the Government of the United States permission to board and search and, if contraband
is found, seize the suspected vessel and hold it for further action by the flag state. In
the latter case, the suspected vessel is normally taken to a port in the United States
where it is held for flag state authorities. The contraband is destroyed by the Government
of the United States, with only evidentiary samples being retained. The crew is either
expelled from the United States to their country or countries of nationality or prosecuted
under United States law if there is sufficient evidence of intent to smuggle the narcotics
into the United States. Due to United States constitutional restraints the Government
of the United States cannot normally enter into undertakings with the flag state to hold
the crew for flag state prosecution. Furthermore, in pursuing the alternative of holding
the vessel for flag state action, it is made clear to the flag state that once the vessel
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is in the United States the claims of third parties against the vessel may make it impossible
for the Government of the United States to release the vessel to the flag state. lIS

As the United Kingdom authorities were not willing to proceed in such
an informal manner, an agreement was negotiated by the United States with
that country, in the form of an exchange of notes,119 modelled to some extent
on the liquor smuggling treaty of 1924. 120 This agreement is a unilateral one;
it allows the United States to board on the high seas (for which the agreement
substituted the phrase "outside the limits of the territorial sea and contiguous
zone of the United States") vessels under the British flag. It does not give
the reciprocal right to the United Kingdom to board vessels under the United
States flag, perhaps because the United States Congress may be still reluctant
to allow United States citizens to be arrested on the high seas by foreign
officials and tried by foreign courts. The boarding is permitted only in two
geographically limited areas, comprising, in the first place, the Gulf of
Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean West of
longitude 55 West and South of latitude 30 North (i.e., a line drawn slightly
East of the Antilles and then West to Florida), and, in the second place, an
area extending 150 miles from the Atlantic coast, North of Florida. United
States authorities are allowed to board in those areas private vessels under
British flag "in any case in which those authorities reasonably believe that
the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for importation into the United States
in violation of the law of the United States."
The agreement relies on the generally recognized reason for boarding,
namely the right of a warship (or Coast Guard vessel) to establish the
nationality of a vessel on the high seas. The boarding party may for this
purpose "examine the ship's papers;" it may also, in this instance, "address
enquiries to those on board," and "take such other measures as are necessary
to establish the place of registration of vessel. " Then comes the shift: "When
these measures suggest that an offense against the laws of the United States
relative to the importation of drugs is being committed, the Government of
the United Kingdom agrees that it will not object to the authorities of the
United States instituting a search of the vessel. " While this provision is farreaching, it may be noted that it implies that the starting point for this
reinforced suspicion cannot be a physical search of the ship (as this is the next
step), but must be the result of findings derived from documents or statements
by the captain or the crew. Finally, if the authorities of the United States
have been led by the search to the belief that an offense against the antidrug laws of the United States is being committed, then they are allowed
to seize the vessel and take it into a United States port.
As all these steps are to a large extent in the discretion of the authorities
of the United States and lend themselves easily to abuse, the United Kingdom
Government reserved to itself the right to object, within 14 days of the vessel's

66

Law of Naval Operations

entry into port, to further exercise of United States' jurisdiction, and the
United States agreed that thereupon it would release the vessel without
charge. Similarly, if the United Kingdom, within 30 days of the vessel's entry
into port, objects to the prosecution of any United Kingdom national found
on board, such person has to be released by the United States. On the other
hand, in a departure from the traditional rule that the flag state is entitled,
and perhaps even obliged, to protect the members of the crew of its vessels
regardless of their nationality,121 the United Kingdom agreed that it "will
not otherwise object to the prosecution of any other person found on board
the vessel." In order to enable the United Kingdom to make these requests,
in every case of boarding of a vessel under the British flag the United States
"shall promptly inform the authorities of the United Kingdom of the action
taken and shall keep them fully informed of any subsequent development. "
There is finally a weak provision for the settlement of disputes under this
agreement, especially those relating to any loss or injury "suffered as a result
of any action taken by the United States in contravention of these
arrangements or any improper or unreasonable action taken by the United
States pursuant thereto." In such a case, "representatives of the two
Governments shall meet to decide any question relating to compensation."
If they don't agree, there is no other recourse, as surprisingly there is no
arbitration treaty between the two countries despite the fact that in the past
they have found it possible to submit many claims to arbitration.
There is not a perfect model, but a good beginning. Perhaps it is even too
good, as the United States has not embarked, as it did in 1924, on a diplomatic
effort to have similar agreements with all other interested States. It is possible
that the mild restrictions of the United Kingdom agreement on possible abuse
of power by the United States authorities are found too uncomfortable; and
that these authorities prefer instead to obtain ad hoc consent for each search
and seizure,l22 or even to pretend that the fact that the flag State did not
later object is equivalent to an ex post facto ratification of the seizure. l23 It
is in order to avoid such abuses of the basic rules of the international law
of the sea and of the interrelated rules of international human rights law,
that the Law of the Sea Conventions require "a treaty" properly defining
the allowable searches and seizures and providing at least some minimum
guarantees that the fate of the ship and of the captain and the crew will not
be at the complete mercy of the foreign warship.124
At the same time, other countries became concerned about the growth of
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the need for adequate international
arrangements to deal with this issue. When the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs established in 1982 an expert group to study the functioning, adequacy
and enhancement of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Canada
used this occasion to propose to that group the preparation of an "arrangement
for law enforcement authorities to board vessels flying foreign flags. "125 The
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group of experts noted that "bilateral arrangements had been made in certain
specified geographic areas whereby ships flying the flag of the other country
concerned could be boarded and inspected in order to apprehend drug
traffickers or to seize illicit narcotic drugs," and recommended the
preparation of a study of existing agreements, analyzing their structure and
functioning, and assessing their usefulness and advisability.l26
On the basis of the experts' report, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and the United
States presented a resolution to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs suggesting
the adoption of certain modest measures "to improve international
cooperation in the maritime interdiction of illicit drug traffic. "127 This
proposal was adopted by the Economic and Social Council, with slight
drafting changes; it emphasized the need for "effective steps by all States
to provide, in accordance with relevant domestic constitutional safeguards
and legislations, for prompt, positive and unmistaken identification of private
vessels registered under their flags," and recommended several steps to
achieve this goal. 128. Neither the four states' proposal, nor the Council's
resolution mentioned, however, the problem of boarding foreign vessels.
Nevertheless, a report by the Secretary-General noted that the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations Secretariat's Division on Narcotic
Drugs have started studying the possible ramifications of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention, especially of Article 27 (criminal jurisdiction on board
a foreign ship in the territorial sea) and Article 108 (cooperation with respect
to illicit traffic on the high seas), as well as of the effect of provisions
broadening the jurisdiction of the coastal States by increasing the breadth
of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone and the establishment of the
exclusive economic zone and archipelagic waters. The view was expressed
that some States seem to expect that "the complex problems States face in
intercepting vessels suspected of smuggling drugs may be overcome with the
entry into force of the Convention, in particular, that drug law enforcement
agencies of States Parties would have a gre~ter ability to take action in respect
of foreign ships in extended areas under their jurisdiction. "129 It was this
approach that the United Kingdom and the United States were trying to avoid
in their 1981 agreementl30 by substituting for the "high seas" a reference to
the area "outside the limits of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone,"
thus indicating indirectly that a coastal State's jurisdiction with respect to
the control of drug trafficking does not extend beyond the limits of the
contiguous zone and does not, in particular, apply to the vast extent of the
exclusive economic zone.
Another approach was tried by two (partly overlapping) groups of Latin
American countries, which proposed in 1984, respectively, that "traffic in
narcotic drugs should be considered a crime against humanity, with all the
legal consequences implicit therein," and that a "special conference should
consider declaring drug trafficking to be a crime against humanity, since it
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seriously affects people's lives, health and welfare, has a negative impact on
the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of
democratic processes in Latin America. "131 These proposals led to the adoption
by the General Assembly of a resolution, supported by several additional
countries of the Americas, Asia and Africa, including Canada and the United
States, requesting the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate the
preparation of a "draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs"
which would deal, in particular, with problems "not envisaged in existing
international instruments. "132 A draft convention, prepared by Venezuela,
was annexed to the resolution; it would have condemned trafficking in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances as "a grave international crime
against humanity," and would have provided also for "imprescriptibility of
the crimes" and "mutual assistance in combating illicit trafficking."133 A
parallel Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse was
adopted by the General Assembly at the same time; it also condemned drug
trafficking, but called it only "an international criminal activity. "134 The
delegate of the United Kingdom immediately objected to the application of
the concept of the crime against humanity, which had "specific connotations
in international law ," and "would give rise to prolonged and unproductive
discussion. "135 On the other hand, the delegate of Argentina considered that
drug trafficking was "a crime against humanity, and its declaration as such
would make way for the formulation of precise legal definitions which would
ensure that the crime was punished and that national borders were no longer
used as shields for committing it. "136
At the 1985 meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, several
representatives made clear that their governments would find it impossible
to accept a convention that included drug trafficking in the definition of
crimes against humanity which had "specific historical and legal
connotations," or included the proposal to make drug traffic crimes
imprescriptible, as this proposal would "run counter to the principles of
widely accepted penal policy." Many representatives supported the inclusion
in the proposed new convention of provisions designed "to strengthen the
capacity of Governments to render mutual law enforcement and judicial
assistance;" in particular, it was emphasized that "the present opportunity
should be taken to consider the problem of drug smuggling by ship," especially
in view of "the difficulty encountered in intercepting suspect vessels on the
high seas." It was also suggested that drug trafficking on the high seas "be
given the same status as piracy, in international law. "137
The Commission asked in 1985 for comments and suggestions concerning
the elements to be included in the proposed convention. Australia replied that
it might prove difficult to incorporate in the convention "the concept of
interception on the high seas of vessels involved in drug trafficking." The
United Kingdom emphasized the importance of maintaining "the principle
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of free right of passage for ships on the high seas." Consequently, it
proposed-together with the United States and Turkey-that any "provision
allowing the stopping and boarding of vessels on the high seas . . . would
have to make such intervention conditional upon the consent of the flag
State." Egypt and Spain called attention to the 1982 Convention of the Law
of the Sea and suggested that Article 108 of that convention could be
elaborated upon in the new convention. Egypt and the United States revived
the idea that "illicit traffic on the high seas might be assimilated to piracy
and treated as such under applicable international law. " To implement that
concept, the United States proposed that the convention should provide "that
a State may request another State [for] authority to board a vessel flying the
latter's flag and seize, arrest and prosecute as appropriate when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such vessel is engaged in drug trafficking;"
and that, upon receipt of such request, "the flag state would be required to
take action to ensure that the vessel is not engaged, or permitted to engage
further, in trafficking." Egypt, on the other hand, suggested that the new
convention should take advantage of Articles 27 (criminal jurisdiction on
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea) and 33 (contiguous
zone) in order to cover also cases of illicit traffic in the territorial sea and
the contiguous zone. 138
Some of these comments were echoed at the next meeting of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Strong opposition was expressed to the
"qualification of illicit traffic as a crime against humanity," and to
imprescriptibility of traffic offenses. On the other hand, several
representatives supported the inclusion of provisions allowing for
"appropriate intervention on the high seas in cases of illicit drug traffic,"
and of provisions encouraging "[i]mproved co-operation and bilateral and
regional agreements in this field. "139 The Commission decided accordingly
to include as one of the elements in its guidelines for the drafting of the
convention the strengthening of "mutual co-operation among States in the
suppression of illicit drug trafficking on the high seas. "140
In June 1986, the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations
Secretariat, with the assistance of a group of experts volunteered by several
nations (including the United States), prepared a preliminary draft on the
convention, Article 12 of which dealt with "illicit traffic by sea. "141 At its
1987 session, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs had also before it another
series of comments by the governments,142 including elaborate comments by
the United States. 143 The Commission was able to engage only in a general
discussion and a preliminary consideration of non-controversial articles and
of the difficult definitional article (Article 1); there was no discussion of
Article 12.144 In the general debate, some representatives mentioned the need
to strengthen Article 12, in order to make the high seas "off limits" to drug
traffickers; others wanted to delete the provisions relating to search and
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seizure of vessels, "because of the serious implications which their
implementations could have in certain areas of international trade and also
in view of their possible abuse by certain States. "145
The Commission asked the Division of Narcotic Drugs to prepare a
working document, consolidating all proposals, and recommended to the
Economic and Social Council the establishment of an open-ended
intergovernmental expert group to review that document, "to reach
agreement on the articles of the convention, wherever possible, and to prepare
a revised working document," to be reviewed by the Commission at the
beginning of 1988. 146 The Economic and Social Council approved this proposal
in May 1987,147 and a group of 135 experts from 57 countries met promptly
in Vienna in June and July 1987, reviewed the Secretariat document,148 and
redrafted a number of articles of the draft convention, including Article 12.149
One further development should be mentioned, which stimulated action
in this field. The International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking, held at Vienna inJune 1987, approved as Target 28 for suggested
courses of action on national, regional and international levels, to establish
control over ships on the high seas and aircraft in international airspace. In
particular, the Conference suggested the following courses of action:
At the national level. Should the ministry or authority concerned have re~sonable grounds
for suspecting that a vessel or aircraft registered under the laws of the State is illicitly
carrying drugs, it may request another State to assist in carrying out a search: for
example, that other State may be asked to direct its authorities to board and inspect
the vessel and, if drugs are found, to seize them and arrest persons involved in the
trafficking. In such circumstances, the State's own authorities may board or seize a vessel
or aircraft registered under its laws. Subject to the provisions of international law , the
law enforcement authorities should, to the fullest extent permitted by national law,
undertake to board and seize a vessel unlawfully carrying drugs, provided that the
authorization of the State of registry and, when applicable, of a coastal State has been
obtained. A State should endeavour to respond promptly when asked for permission
to stop, board and search a vessel under its registry for reasons of illicit drug trafficking
control. Subject to the same considerations, an aircraft may be subject to search upon
landing at a designated airport.
The appropriate ministry or authority should, after the seizure ofsuch a vessel or aircraft,
deal promptly with illicit drugs and traffickers found thereon under the country's own
laws if the conveyance is registered under that country's laws or, if registered under
the laws of another State, pursuant to such agreement as is reached with the State of
registry without unnecessary delay.
States could authorize the appropriate agency or responsible authority to take
appropriate action in these matters. This action might include the prompt
communication of information indicating whether a particular vessel or aircraft is
registered under the laws of the requested State and also authority to empower a
requesting State to seize the suspect vessel or aircraft.
At the regional and international levels. International bodies and States could consider whether
international standards can be established for the identification, seizure and disposition
of vessels and aircraft on the surface suspected of carrying drugs illicitly, and of the
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drugs and traffickers found thereon. States should also make every effort to conclude
bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements to strengthen such co-operation between
States.lSQ

At the same time, the Conference made clear that "appropriate co-operative
procedures need to be devised which do not interfere with legitimate passage
of commerce," and which comply with "existing relevant conventions."151
In settling these issues, as shown over almost two hundred years of efforts,
it did not prove easy to establish the balance between two aspects of national
sovereignty-the freedom of a state's ship to navigate the oceans without
interference by other states, and the right of other states to protect some
important interests against a possibility of interference by foreign vessels
engaged in a generally condemned activity. In the field of slavery, despite
repeated efforts by some governments, international conferences consistently
rejected any interference with foreign vessels which would go beyond the
right to approach and to ascertain a vessel's flag and registration, and all
attempts to equate slavery with piracy were unsuccessful. Once a vesse1's
nationality has been ascertained, any further action had to be deferred to the
flag state.
Are coastal states entitled to go further as far as illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs is concerned? At the Third Law of the Sea Conference, only a few
years ago, the decision went in the opposite direction, and the proposals to
put drug trafficking on the same level as slavery were clearly rejected. In
other negotiations, attempts to include illicit drug traffic among "crimes
against humanity" were strongly opposed. There is clearly a hierarchy herepiracy, slavery, drug traffic; and the measures that may be taken against a
vessel engaging in such activities diminish gradually.
In the recent negotiations on the new convention against illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the old arguments were often
repeated, though sometimes in new, more modern guises.
In particular as was noted previously, several proposals were made to
declare that the traffic in illicit drugs was a "crime against humanity" or
that it should be assimilated to "piracy. "152 In view of the strong opposition
to these proposals by other Governments,153 the Secretariat of the United
Nations did not include this concept in its early drafts,154 and no further
mention was made of this issue. The United Kingdom was not able to achieve
this objective with respect to slavery; now, it was the United States that was
trying to achieve a similar goal with respect to the illicit drug traffic, but
the opposition of the United Kingdom and other States made it impossible.
Article 12 of the Secretariat's 1986 Draft155 became the focus of the debate
on the "illicit traffic by sea." To facilitate the comparison, the semifinal text,
referred by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1988 to the Plenipotentiary
Conference, is also included here, the changes in the two texts being italicized,
together with additions or omissions.
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1986 Text:

1988 Text:

1. The Parties shall co-operate to
the fullest extent possible to suppress
the illicit traffic in controlled substances
by sea.

1. The Parties shall co-operate to
the fullest extent possible to suppress
the illicit traffic by sea.

2. A Party which has reasonable
grounds to suspect that a vessel
registered under its laws is being used for
the illicit traffic in controlled substances
may request the assistance of other
Parties in suppressing its use for that
purpose. Parties so requested shall
render such assistance, within the
means available to them.

2. If a Party, which has reasonable
grounds to suspect that a vessel flying
its flag or not displaying aflag or markings
of registry is being used for the illicit
traffic, requests the assistance of other
Parties in suppressing its use for that
purpose, the Parties so requested shall
render such assistance, within the
means available to them.

3. A Party which has reasonable
grounds to believe that a vessel is
engaged in illicit traffic and is on the
high seas as defined in Part VII of the
United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea may board, search and seize
such a vessel if:
(a) The vessel is registered under its
law; or
(b) That Party seeks and receives
permission from the Party of registry; or
(c ) The vessel is not displaying a flag
or markings of registry.

3. Without prejudice to any rights
provided for under general international
law, a Party, which has reasonable
grounds for believing that a vessel that
is beyond the external limits of the
territorial sea of any State and is flying the
flag ofanother Party is engaged in illicit
traffic, may, if that Party has received
prior permission from the flag State,
board, search and, if evidence of illicit
traffic is discovered, seize such a vessel.

4. A Party shall respond in an
expeditious manner to requests from
another Party to determine, for the
purpose of paragraph 3 of this article,
whether a vessel is registered under
its laws, and to requests for permission made pursuant to the provisions
in that paragraph. Each Party shall
designate an authority to receive and
act upon such requests. The authority
designated by each Party for this
purpose shall be notified through the
Secretary General to all other
Parties.

4. For the purposes ofparagraph 3 ofthis
article, a Party shall respond in an
expeditious manner to requests from
another Party to determine whether
a vessel is registered under its law
and to requests for permission made
pursuant to the provisions in that
paragraph. At the time ofadhering to the
Convention, each Party shall designate
an authority to receive and respond
to such requests. The authority
designated by each Party for this
purpose shall be notified through the
Secretary-General to all other
Parties within one month of the
designation.
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5. Wh,ere evidence of illicit traffic

is found, the Party having custody of

the vessel shall take appropriate
action with respect to the vessel and
persons on board, in accordance
with:
(a) Its own judicial requirements if the
vessel is registered under its lawsj or
(b) Existing bilateral treaties, where
applicable, or any agreement or
arrangement otherwise reached at the
time of seizure with the Party of registry.

the vessel shall take appropriate
action with respect to the vessel and
persons on board, in accordance with
treaties, where applicable, or any
prior agreement or arrangement
otherwise reached with the flag State.

6. The right to challenge the nature or
effect of the agreement or arrangement
referred to in paragraph 5 (b) of this article
shall rest exclusively with the Party of
registry.

6. A Party which has taken any action
contemplated in this article shall promptly
inform the flag State concerned of the
results of that action.

7. The Parties shall consider entering into bilateral and regional
agreements to carry out, or to
enhance the effectiveness of, the
provisions of this article.

7. The Parties shall consider entering into bilateral and regional
agreements to carry out, or to
enhance the effectiveness of, the
provisions of this article.

No change was made in paragraph 7, and only minor changes were made
in paragraphs 1 and 4. Paragraph 2 was redrafted slightly to include some
phrases from the original paragraph 3 relating to a vessel that is not displaying
a flag or markings of registry. Paragraphs 3 and 5 were the most controversial
provisions.
As far as paragraph 3 was concerned, it was already mentioned that the
controversy over the status of the exclusive economic zone, which has plagued
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,l56 was revived
during the preparation of the draft convention against the illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 157 The 1986 Secretariat Draft
allowed the boarding of a suspected vessel "on the high seas as defined in
Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. "158 Part
VII, entitled "High Seas" does not actually define the high seas, but in Article
86 merely states that it applies "to all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." At the
same time, Article 86 makes clear, however, that this provision "does not
entail any abridgement of the freedoms [of the high seas] enjoyed by all States
in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with Article 58." Article 58,
in turn, mentions expressly the freedom of navigation and the applicability
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in the exclusive economic zone of Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules
of international law , thus including Articles 92 (exclusive jurisdiction of the
flag State), 108 (illicit traffic in narcotic drugs), 110 (right of visit) and 111
(right of hot pursuit ceases "as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial
sea of its own State or of a third State").159
To avoid any conflict with respect to the meaning of the "high seas" phrase,
the United States immediately proposed that the right to board a suspected
vessel should extend to the whole area "outside the territory and the
territorial sea of any State," thus including the contiguous zone and the
exclusive economic zone within the area in which boarding does not require
the consent of the coastal State. This proposal was without prejudice to the
requirement of "prior consent of the State of registry. "160 The United States
proposal was accepted by the Intergovernmental Expert Group, whose draft
authorized the boarding of a suspected vessel "beyond the external limits of
the territorial sea of any State." The group also added, at the beginning of
paragraph 3, the phrase "[w ]ithout prejudice to any rights provided for under
general international law. "161
At the 1988 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, several
representatives expressed reservations about paragraph 3. One of them
proposed redrafting the first phrase to read: "Without prejudice to any rights
conferred on the coastal State under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea ... " Another one proposed, more elaborately, to revise that
sentence as follows: "Without prejudice to the right deriving from the rules
and principles of international law , particularly in the zone contiguous to the
territorial sea." Alternately, that representative suggested a new paragraph
3 reading: "The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not affect the
rights which the coastal State may exercise, in conformity with international
law, in the zone contiguous to its territorial sea." Other representatives
pointed out that the text adopted by the Expert Group "could imply that
third States would be given certain rights in the area between 12 and 200
miles (Exclusive Economic Zone) which were not contemplated in the
Convention on the Law of the Sea." They argued, therefore, for restoring
the original phraseology proposed by the Secretariat. In response, one
representative supported the language proposed by the Expert Group on the
ground that the International Maritime Organization, when faced with a
similar issue in drafting the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,162 decided also to use a phrase
referring to jurisdiction "beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea. "163
Other issues were also raised. One representative, taking into account
Article 107 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, suggested that "a search
or seizure may be effected only by a ship and/or aircraft which was clearly
marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to
undertake such activities. "164 Another representative commented on
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paragraph 5, according to which, where evidence of illicit traffic is found,
"the Party having custody of the vessel shall take appropriate action." He
pointed out that the notion of" custody of the vessel" covered a legal situation
not contemplated by the draft convention, and proposed that the main part
of the sentence be simplified to read: "the Party which has intercepted a vessel
pursuant to paragraph 3 shall take appropriate action with respect to the vessel
and persons on board, in accordance with treaties or with any prior agreement
or arrangement reached with the flag State. "165 It may be noted that this text
and the Commission's 1988 version differ here from the 1986 text by
emphasizing the need for a "prior" agreement or arrangement, thus coming
closer to Article 108 of the Convention on the Law of the Seas which allows
measures going beyond a visit to verify the ship's right to fly its flag only
"where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by a treaty." Two
steps seem to be thus required: a prior agreement (under paragraph 7)
establishing the means for obtaining permission allowing a foreign authority
to go beyond a visit and to search or seize a ship; and an actual grant of
approval for a particular action, Le., to search the ship only, or to search
and, if evidence of illicit traffic is found, to seize that evidence (and transmit
it to the flag State for further action), or to seize the ship and arrest the persons
engaged in illicit traffic.
Several representatives, by analogy to Articles 106 and 110, paragraph 3,
of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, proposed that a new paragraph
should be inserted in Article 12 to guarantee compensation for vessels that
were subjected to unjustified search measures, to be paid by the State that
organized the search and determined its scope. Although the flag State had
granted its approval for a search, it should not bear responsibility as its
permission was dependent on the information provided by the State requesting
a search.166
Finally, one more general comment was made. One representative stressed
that it should be stipulated in the preamble to the Convention that the
measures envisaged in the Convention "must be consistent with human rights,
respect the traditions and customs of national or regional groups and protect
the environment. " He also proposed that the Convention should indicate that
"international co-operation, whether bilateral or multilateral, should develop
free of pressures of any kind. "167
At the end of the debate, several representatives expressed the following
conclusions: that Article 12 provided "a workable mechanism to facilitate
international co-operation against illicit traffic on the high seas;" that it "took
into account the need not to interfere with legitimate rights of passage;" that,
by requiring "the consent of the flag State priO! to intervention, [it] preserved
the important principle of flag State responsibility;" and that, in spite of the
difficulties faced by some States, the article reflected the compromise reached
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by the Expert Group, which merited consolidation by the Plenipotentiary
Conference.t68
Without making any changes itself, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
decided to forward draft Article 12 to the Plenipotentiary Conference "for
appropriate consideration. "169
On the Commission's recommendation,11o the Economic and Social Council
decided to convene a further group of experts to review the outstanding issues,
and to convene thereafter a plenipotentiary conference to complete the
negotiations and adopt the final version of the Convention. l71
The United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances met in Vienna
from November 25 to December 20, 1988. The final text was adopted by
consensus, without vote, on December 19, 1988, and 43 of the 106 States
participating in the Conference signed it on December 20. The signatory states
ranged from Afghanistan to Zaire, including China, the United Kingdom and
the United States; France and the Soviet Union were not, however, among
the original signatories. 172 The 35 substantive articles of the Convention
impose upon the parties an obligation to take specific law enforcement
measures to improve their ability to deal more effectively with various aspects
of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs having an international dimension (Article
2).173 In the preamble to the Convention, the parties recognize that "the illicit
traffic is an international activity, the suppression of which demands urgent
attention and highest priority;" and express, in particular, their determination
"to improve international cooperation in the suppression of illicit traffic by
sea. "
The final text, as revised by the May 1988 Review Group174 and the
Conference, deals with maritime interdiction in Article 17; in addition,
certain jurisdictional aspects are dealt with in Article 4(1)(b)(ii).
The final text of Article 17 reads as follows:
1. The Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic

by sea, in conformity with the international law of the sea.
2. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel flying its flag or not
displaying a flag or marks of registry is engaged in illicit traffic may request the assistance
of other Parties in suppressing its use for that purpose. The Parties so requested shall
render such assistance within the means available to them.
3. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom
of navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying
marks of registry of another Party is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify the flag
State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from
the flag State to take appropriate measures in regard to that vessel.
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in force between them
or in accordance with any agreement or arrangement otherwise reached between those
Parties, the flag State may authorize the requesting State to, inter alia:
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(a) Board the vessel;
(b) Search the vessel;
(c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with
respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board.
5. Where action is taken pursuant to this article, the Parties concerned shall take due
account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel
and the cargo or to prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or
any other interested State.
6. The flag State may, consistent with its obligations in paragraph 1 of this article,
subject its authorization to conditions to be mutually agreed between it and the
requesting Party, including conditions relating to responsibility.
7. For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article, a Party shall respond
expeditiously to a request from another Party to determine whether a vessel that is
flying its flag is entitled to do so, and to requests for authorization made pursuant to
paragraph 3. At the time of becoming a Party to this Convention, each Party shall
designate an authority or, when necessary, authorities to receive and respond to such
requests. Such designation shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other
Parties within one month of the designation.
8. A Party which has taken action in accordance with this article shall promptly inform
the flag State concerned of the results of that action.
9. The Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or
arrangements to carry out, or to enhance the effectiveness of, the provisions of this
article.
10. Action pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be carried out only by warships
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being
on government service and authorized to that effect.
11. Any action taken in accordance with this article shall take due account of the need
not to interfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the exercise ofjurisdiction
of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea.

The next text is an amalgamation of the previous drafts, using some
language of both the 1986 Secretariat text and that of the earlier Review
Group, which the Commission on Narcotic Drugs forwarded to the
Conference,175 with certain changes and several additions. In particular, two
references were added to the "international law of the sea," it being generally
understood, and expressly stated by the United States delegation, that these
references relate to international customary law, as reflected in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus paragraph 1 follows
clearly Article 108(1) of that Convention, and paragraph 2 is based on its
Article 108(2), and, following recent practice, expands the right to request
assistance to include the case of illicit traffic by stateless vessels. It is also
necessary to note that new paragraph 11 requires that any interdiction action
"shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or affect the rights
and obligations of the coastal States in accordance with international law,"
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which have been considerably broadened by the 1982 Convention. The United
States delegation made clear, however, during the negotiations that this
paragraph refers only to those situations in which a coastal state has generally
recognized rights beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, as in the case
of hot pursuit in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas, and the
right to take action in the contiguous zone for the limited purposes recognized
in Article 33 of the LOS Convention.
Paragraphs 3-6 expand considerably the text contained in earlier drafts and
define more clearly the respective rights of the flag state and of the state
wishing to search a foreign ship. A state having reasonable grounds to suspect
that a vessel flying the flag of another state is engaged in illicit drug traffic
may take three steps: (a) notify the flag state so that this state itself may take
the necessary action; (b) request confirmation of registry; and (c) if registry
is confirmed, request authorization from the flag state to "take appropriate
measures in regard to that vessel." It is thus made clear that, once it is
confirmed that the vessel is actually entitled to fly the flag of another state,
no action can be taken against the vessel without express authorization of
the flag state.
The authorization can be made directly "pursuant to this article" of the
1988 Convention, and in such case no additional agreement or arrangement
is required. The Convention encourages the parties, however, to enter into
bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements to carry out the provisions
of this article (paragraph 9); and the United States has already started to
conclude such agreements. 176 It is not clear what is meant by "arrangements;"
it probably means exchanges of notes or other executive agreements not
requiring ratification, but does not include informal ad hoc agreements reached
by telephone at the time of a request for authorization.
Whether or not there is an agreement or arrangement, the flag state has
several choices. In the first place, it may authorize the requesting state only
to board the vessel (e.g., to ascertain the registration); or it may authorize
a search of the vessel; or, if that search finds evidence of involvement in illicit
traffic, the flag state may authorize the requesting state to "take appropriate
action with respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board" (paragraph
4). In the second place, the flag state may, consistent with its obligation to
"cooperate to the fullest extent" (paragraph 1), "subject its authorization
to conditions to be mutually agreed" by the two states concerned. If the
requesting state is not able or willing to comply with those conditions, the
authorization can be denied. One of the conditions may be that the requesting
state should agree to be responsible for any damage caused by its action against
the vessel (paragraph 6). This may be onerous, as the Convention also provides
that in any action to be taken under this article, the requesting state must
"take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the
security of the vessel and the cargo." More broadly, it shall not "prejudice
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the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other interested
State" (paragraph 5).
Paragraphs 7 and 8 reflect the prior drafts, with only minor changes.
Paragraphs 9 and 11 have already been discussed above. In accordance with
the new paragraph 10, action under this Article can be taken only by "warships
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable
as being on government service and authorized to that effect. " This provision
reflects several articles of the 1982 LOS Convention. 1n
By thus codifying the rules on interdiction of foreign vessels, the
Conference took an important step which would bring the campaign against
illicit drugs to a point beyond that ever reached by the crusade against slave
trade. Whether this step will endanger the freedom of the high seas will
depend on the interpretation of the provisions relating to the obligation
J
requiring the prior consent of the flag state, not merely in a particular case,
under pressure of the circumstances, but through a properly ratified, bilateral
or multilateral agreement, containing proper safeguards against abuse. 178 In
the 1920s it proved possible for the United States to conclude sixteen such
agreements in order to combat liquor traffic. 179 Perhaps it may be possible
to conclude agreements similar to the one made with the United Kingdom
in 1981,180 which would permit the United States-in the words of paragraph
9 of Article 17 of the Convention-"to carry out, or to enhance the
effectiveness of, the provision of [ that] article." Only that kind of action
would maintain the integrity of Article 110 of the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and would protect the United States and its Navy against the
disintegration of the concept of the freedom of the high seas, on which the
security of the United States depends. 181
Notes
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t. As Professors McDougal and Burke have pointed out, the story of the attempts to broaden the
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and William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1962), p. 88t.
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of the high seas, or the exploration of the mineral resources of the seabed area beyond the limits of national
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see United Nations Legislative Series, v. 1, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc.
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For punishment of British commanders for illegal captures of slave ships, see infra note 21. See also
the treaty of 1862, infra, note 31, Article 7, and the text preceding that note.
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The Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Prussia, September 10, 1785, provided in Article XV that
even in time of war between one party and a third power, if a vessel of war of the belligerent party
should encounter the vessel of the neutral party on the high seas, it would not be permitted to approach
the neutral vessel within a cannon-shot, nor send more than two or three men in their boat on board
that vessel, to examine her sea-letters or passports (i.e., documents proving their neutral nationality);
and should the persons belonging to the war vessel "molest or injure in any manner whatever the people,
vessels, or effect of the other part," they would be "responsible in their persons and property for damages
and interest." As at that time, the United States Navy had to rely for assistance on privateers, there was
the additional provision that "all commanders of private owned vessels" must give sufficient security
for such damages "before they are commissioned." William M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between
the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1910), v. 2, pp. 1477, 1482.
For a spirited defense of the United States' need for privateers, see the statement of U.S. Minister at
London, Mr. James Buchanan (later President of the United States), March 24, 1854, reprinted in John
Basset Moore, A Digest of International Law (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), v. 7,
p. 550. In 1856, the United States Government announced its willingness to adhere to the Declaration
of Paris abolishing privateering, provided that at the same time the other powers would agree that "the
private property of subjects and citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempt from seizure
by the public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband," thus evening the odds
between Great Britain, then the biggest naval power, and the United States, then having the biggest
merchant marine (easily changeable to privateering). See id., pp. 563-65. See also the statement by Secretary
of State Marcy, July 28, 1856, M., pp. 552-54.
4. Le Louis, 2 Dodson 210, 243-44 (High Court of Admiralty, 1817); reprinted in James Brown Scott,
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In a similar spirit, Justice Story stated that:
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interests of the whole international community." Id.
7. See Moore, supra note 3, pp. 987-1001; and Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), v. 2, p. 659.
In the Trent incident in 1861, a United States warship removed Confederate commissioners from a British
mail steamer. When they were later released to the British ambassador, Secretary of State Seward
explained that United States action was inconsistent with the principles espoused by the United States
in the impressment of seamen case. He quoted from an 1804 statement of James Monroe, then Secretary
of State in the Jefferson Administration, that leaving the decision about the future of an individual to
a naval officer rather than a tribunal would be contrary to "[r]eason, justice and humanity." Moore,
supra, note 3, v. 7, pp. 626-29. See also id., pp. 768-79.
8. Reproduced in Moore, supra note 3, v. 2. p. 998.
9. Id., at p. 999.
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and Company, 1858) p. 18 (an excellent brief for freedom of vessels from visit and search by foreign
warships).
13. Le Louis, supra note 4, pp. 240, 253-58. This decision was followed closely by ChiefJustice Marshall
in The Antelope, 23 u.s. (10 Wheaton) 66, 118-23 (1825). His main conclusion was:
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of
nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully
impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone.
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14. Letter to British Minister at Washington, August IS, 1821, reproduced in Moore, supra note 3,
v. 2, p. 919. When John Quincy Adams was Ambassador to Great Britain, he was asked whether there
could be a worse evil than the slave trade. He replied tartly that it would be a much worse evil if the
United States Government should allow any vessel flying the Stars and Stripes to be stopped and examined
by a British cruiser, for that would be to make slaves of the whole American people. Quoted from W.
E. F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers: The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Schocken,
1970), p. 161. For a slightly different version of this statement, see Hugh G. Soulsby, The Right of Search
and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations, 1814-1862 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 18,
published in 51 Johns Hopkins University, Studies in Historical and Political Science (1933), No.2, p.
18.
15. Letter from Mr. Adams to Mr. Canning, June 24,1823, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Second
Series, v. 5 (1858) pp. 330, 331-32. The text of the draft convention prepared by Mr. Adams may be found
in id., pp. 335-37.
16. Act to Punish the Crime of Piracy, May IS, 1820, U.S. Statutes at Large, v. 3, p. 600; Act for
a More Effectual Suppression of the African Slave Trade, March 31,1824, British Statutes, v. 27, 5 George
IV, ch. 17, reprinted in American State Papers, supra note IS, v. 5, p. 342.
17. U.S. Congress, Resolution on Slave Trade, 1823, Annals of Congress, 17th Congress, 2d session, pp.
928, 1147-55.
18. British and Foreign State Papers, v. 12, 1824-25, p. 838, Articles V and X.
19. See Moore, supra note 3, v. 2, pp. 924-26.
20. This clause, which is the source of the modern clause authorizing the boarding of stateless vessels
(see infra, text preceding note 89), was suggested to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, by
Lord Minto, First Lord of Admiralty, who pointed out the practice of slave traders, when threatened
with capture, to dispense completely with flag and papers. As the jurisdiction of courts over slave trade
offenses was based either on the trader's British nationality or on a treaty with his flag state, the courts
have held that "[i]f a ship's nationality could not be established with any certainty, neither a mixed court
nor a national court had jurisdiction over it, and it could not be condemned." On the other hand, such
a ship could not claim the protection of any government, and a British law could empower British cruisers
to search and capture slave ships not entitled to the protection of any state, and to take them before British
admiralty courts. See Leslie M. Bethell, "Britain, Portugal and the Suppression of the Brazilian Slave
Trade: The Origins of Lord Palmerston's Act of 1839," English Historical Review, v. 80 (1965), pp. 761,
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21. For the text of the act, see 2 & 3 Viet., ch. 73. For its discussion, see William Law Mathieson,
Great Britain and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (London, 1929: reprinted by Octagon Books: New York, 1967),
p. 23. Mathieson also points out that to escape the British warships, the slave ships progressed from the
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naturally and inevitably with the only Power which had refused to concede the right of search." Id.,
p.25.
The provision abolishing the jurisdiction of courts to award damages in cases of captures of vessels
which were not based on a treary with the £lag state was necessary as British courts considered such
captures illegal and imposed on the commanders of warships responsible for such captures the obligation
to pay heavy compensation for all damages and losses. See, e.g., the case of the Gaviao, Ward, supra note
14, pp. 84-86; and the cases cited in Soulsby, supra note 14, pp. 73-75. But see Buron v. Denman, id., pp.
186-87, discussed in Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade (London: Frank Cass, 1949, reprinted
1968), pp. 97-99; Mathieson, supra, pp. 92-93 (citing Exchequer Reports, (1848), v. 2, p. 167) (decided for
Denman "because his proceedings, though contrary to the law of nations as laid down by Sir William
Scott in the [Le Louis] case, had been endorsed by the British Government").
22. See Bethell, supra note 20, pp. 778-79
23. See id., pp. 780-81. A similar crisis arose in 1845, when the 1826 Brazilian-British treary for the
suppression of slave trade expired and Brazil notified the British Government that the British cruisers
had lost, therefore, their right to visit and search Brazilian ships. The British response was contained
in the so-called "Lord Aberdeen's Act," British Statutes, v. 35, 8-9 Vict., ch. 122, of August 8, 1845,
which relied on the provision of the 1826 treary which condemned slave trade as piracy, and on that basis
applied to Brazil provisions similar to those enacted in 1839 against Portugal (supra, note 21), allowing
search and capture, and empowering British admiralry courts to condemn the vessels found guilry of slave
trade, etc. For the history of the 1845 Act, see Wilbur Devereux Jones, "The Origins and Passage of
Lord Aberdeen's Act," Hispanic American Historical Review, v. 42 (1962), pp. 502, 512-20.
24. Ward, supra note 14, p. 140.
25. Soulsby, supra note 14, pp. 58-59. See also id., pp. 56-57, for an earlier United States note on this
subject, and id., pp. 60-61, for an elaborate reply by Lord Palmerston. The dispute did not stop there;
for further correspondence on the subject, see id., pp. 61-72. The British Government has, however,
indemnified the United States for unjustified seizures, though sometimes after long delays, id., pp. 7376.
26. Treary to settle and define the boundaries between the territories of the United States and the
possessions of Her Britannic Majesry in North America, for the final suppression of the African slave
trade, etc., August 9,1842, Articles VIII and IX, 8 Statutes at Large 572, U.S. Treary Series 119, 12 Bevans
82.
27. Concerning the drafting of the treary, the acrimonious debate in Congress, and the difficulties
that arose as to its interpretation, see Soulsby, supra note 14, pp. 78-106. See also Moore, supra note 3, v.
2, pp. 930-41.
28. See Lloyd, supra note 21, p. 41.
29. Note on April 10, 1858, reprinted, in part, in Moore, supra note 3, v. 2, pp. 942-43.
30. See Mathieson, supra note 21, p. 156. See also Moore, supra note 3, v. 2, pp. 941-45; Soulsby, supra
note 14, pp. 139-66. Seizures of American £lag vessels did not cease, however, and a new controversy
arose with respect to the right of a warship to compel a merchant vessel to display its £lag, as some masters
of American vessels manifested a disinclination to hoist a £lag when asked by a British warship. This problem
was finally solved by the issuance of instructions that captains in the merchant service should "display
their colors as promptly as possible, whenever they meet upon the ocean an armed cruiser of any nation."
See Soulsby, supra, pp. 166-72.
31. Treary for the Suppression of African Slave Trade, April 7, 1862, as amended on February 17,
1863, U.S. Statutes at Large, v. 12, p. 1225; v. 13, p. 645; Malloy, supra note 3, v. 1, pp. 674, 687.
Annex B to the treaty (id., pp. 681-87) contained detailed Regulations for the Mixed Courts of Justice,
which provided, for instance, in Article IV that in case of a disagreement between the two judges "they
should draw by lot the name of one of the two arbitrators," who shall consult with the two judges, the
final decision being rendered by the majoriry of the three.
32. See W. E. B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 16381870 (1896, reprinted by Schoken Books: New York, 1969), pp. 287-88. This book contains also an excellent
"chronological conspectus of state, national, and international legislation," with a summary oflegislative
history, and citation of sources for each item. Id., pp. 230-88.
According to Moore, supra note 3, v. 2, p: 467, no vessels were known to have been condemned in
the British-American Mixed Courts by 1868. See also Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal
Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universiry of California Press, 1963), pp. 63-64. For a report
from the United States members of the Mixed Court at Freetown, Sierra Leone, see the Message of the
President of the United States on African slave trade, July 2, 1864, 38th Congress, 1st session, Senate Exec.
Doc. No. 56, pp. 24-26 (containing recommendations, inter alia, for technical assistance in labor-saving
devices to tribes willing to abandon slavery). An analysis of the work of all the Mixed Commissions and
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Courts may be found in Leslie M. Bethell, "The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the
Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, v. 7 (1966), p. 79-93.
33. Convention for the Suppression of Slave Trade, June 3, 1870, Malloy, supra note 3, v. I, p. 693.
Article 2 of the accompanying Instructions provided that any search authorized by the Convention "shall
be conducted with the courtesy and consideration which ought to be observed between allied and friendly
nations."
34. See Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (London: Longman, 1975), p. 16, no. 40
and pp. 19-20, n. 61.
35. Id., pp. 211-21. See also Christopher Lloyd, supra note 21, pp. 187-274.
36. Miers, supra note 34, pp. 233-34, 238, 240.
37. Id., p. 241.
38. Id., pp. 241-42.
39. 27 Statutes at Large 886; U.S. Treaty Series 383; 1 Bevans 134. Chapter I dealt with measures
to be taken in the places of origin of the slave trade; chapter II with transportation of slaves by land;
chapter III on trade by sea is discussed in the preceding text; chapter IV prohibited the importation of
slaves by countries where domestic slavery still existed; chapter V provided for the establishment of an
international information office in Zanzibar (with a supplementary, more limited office in Brussels), which
was given the task to centralize all documents relating to the capture of vessels and their condemnation
or release, and all information that might lead to the discovery of persons engaged in slave trade.
40. See Miers, supra note 34, pp. 244-45.
41. Id., p. 293.
42. See, e.g., the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery, U.N. Doc. E/1988 (1951), 13 ESCOR,
Annexes Ag. Item 21, p. I, para. 8-19; Benjamin Whitaker, Slavery: Report to the U.N. Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1982120/Rev. 1 (1984); U.N.
Pub!. Sales No. E.84.XIV.I (1984), pp. 10-20, especially 18-20.
43. Convention on the Revision ... of the General Act ... of Brussels, St. Germain-en-Laye,
September 10, 1919, Articles 11 and 13, 49 Stat. 3027; U.S. Treaty Series 877; 2 Bevans 261. See also Miers,
supra note 34, pp. 309-14. In consequence of the 1919 Convention, the 1890 Brussels Act does not apply
any longer as between the United States, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the United
Kingdom.
44. See United Nations, The Suppression of Slavery (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General
to the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery of the Economic and Social Council), U.N. Doc. STISOA/4 (1951),
U.N. Pub!. Sales No. 1951.XIV.2}, pp. 12-14, 16-19, See also Joyce A. Gutteridge, "Supplementary Slavery
Convention, 1956," International Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 6, pp. 449, 454-56. For the text of the AntiSlavery Convention, Geneva, September 25, 1926, see 46 Stat. 2183, U.S. Treaty Series 778, 2 Bevans 607,
60 League of Nations Treaty Series 253. A protocol of December 7, 1953, transferred the functions of
the League of Nations under the 1926 Convention to the United Nations, 7 UST 479; TIAS No. 3532;
182 UNTS 57.
For the text of the Convention on the Suppression of International Trade in Arms and Ammunition
and in Implements of War, June 17, 1925, see Malloy, supra note 3, v. 4 (ed. by E. J. Trenwith, 1938),
p. 4903; Manley O. Hudson, ed., International Legislation, v. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1931), p. 1634. The convention was ratified by the United States, but it did not
enter into force, as it did not seem to have received the necessary 14 ratifications. See Hackworth, supra
note 7, v. 2, p. 672. The relevant provisions of that convention were Articles 12, 20-24, and Annex II,
section II (Maritime Supervision).
45. See Gutteridge, supra note 44, p. 460. See, however, the exchange of notes accompanying the treaty
of friendship and mutual co-operation of February 10, 1934, between the British Government and the
Imam of Yemen, in which the Imam agreed to the prohibition of the African slave trade and commended
his governors to do their utmost to prevent it in both the country and the ports. 157 LNTS 63, 73.
46. U.N. Doc. E/1988 supra note 42, para. 27, and recommendation B.2. See also Gutteridge, supra
note 44, 460.
Slavery and slave trade have been considered by the United Nations as prohibited activities, as violations
of basic human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly
in 1948, provided that "[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and slave trade shall be
prohibited in all these forms." General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), December 10, 1948, Article 4,
3 GAOR, Part I, Resolutions, p. 71. An almost identical provision is contained in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), December 16, 1966,
Article 8, 99 UNTS 171. (By December 31, 1987, this Covenant has been ratified or acceded to by 87
states; the United States has signed this document but has not ratified it.) For a summary of action taken
by the United Nations in the field of slavery, see Whitaker, supra note 42, pp. 27-30.
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47. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/254O/Add.4 (1954); 17 ESCOR, Annexes, Ag. Item 15, p. 9, Annex
(Draft Convention), Article 2. For comments on that document, see U.N. Docs. E/AC.43/L.1 (1955) and
Adds. 1 and 2 (1956).
48. U.N. Doc. E/2824 (1956), 21 ESCOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 12, p. 1, paras. 97-139, and Annex
I (Draft Convention), Article 3; Gutteridge, supra note 44, p. 466.
49. Gutteridge, supra note 44, pp. 466-69; U.N. Secretariat, Memorandum on the Relation between
the Articles concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the International Law Commission and International
Agreements Dealing with the Suppression of the Slave Trade, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13n (1957), paras.
17-25, reprinted in 1958 LOS Conference supra note 6, v. I, pp. 165-68.
50. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Geneva, September 7, 1956, Articles 3 and 4, 18 U.S.T 3201, T.I.A.S 6418,
266 U.N.T.S 3.
51. U.N. Doc. AlCN.4/17 (1950), p. 12.
52. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/42 (1951), p. 22. Professor Francois relied on a statement by Justice Story that
a warship seizes a foreign vessel at its peril and, if unjustified, "must make full compensation." The Marianna
Flora, supra note 4, p. 42 (1826).
53. See supra notes 42 and 46.
54. See supra text preceding note 40.
55. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/42, supra note 52, pp. 23-29.
56. See supra note 46.
57. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, v. 1, pp. 350-54, especially 123rd meeting,
paras. 91, 109-10, 124, 127-28, 132.
58. Report of the International Law Commission, 6 U.N. GAOR, Suppl. No.9, U.N. Doc. A/1858
(1951) p. 16, reprinted in Yearbook, supra note 57, v. 2, pp. 139-40.
59. U.N. Doc. AlCN.4/51 (1952), p. 9.
60. U., p. 11.
61. Francois, Sixth Report, A/CN.4n9 (1954), pp. 23-27; International Law Commission, Seventh
Session, Report, 10 GAOR, Suppl. No.9, U.N. Doc. A12934 (1955), pp. 6-8, reprinted in Yearbook, supra
note 57, 1955, v. 2, pp. 24-27. Francois acknowledged that the piracy articles were a condensation of a
more elaborate draft convention prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law in 1932, reprinted
in the American Journal of International Law, v. 26 (1932), Suppl., pp. 739-885. See Yearbook, supra, 1955, v.
1, p. 39.
62. Yearbook, supra note 57, 1955, v. 1, p. 20.
63. U., pp. 26-27.
64. U., pp. 28-29, 31-33.
65. U., pp. 29, 31.
66. Proposal by Mr. Edmonds (Commission member from the United States), M., p. 32. See also statement
by Mr. Garcia Amador, id., p. 29.
67. Id., pp. 33-34. See also id., p. 229.
68. See the Commission's 1955 report, 10 GAOR, Suppl. No.9, U.N. Doc. Al2934 (1955), p. 8, reprinted
in Yearbook, supra note 57,1955, v. 2, p. 27.
69. 1955 Report, supra note 68, Article 21, p. 8, reprinted in 1955 Yearbook, supra note 68, v. 2, pp.
26-27; Commission's 1956 Report, 11 GAOR, Suppl. No.9, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), Article 46, pp.
29-30, reprinted in Yearbook, supra note 57, 1956, v. 2, pp. 283-84. See also Francois Report, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/97 and Adds. 1 to 3 (1956), reprinted in Yearbook, supra note 57, 1956, v. 2, p. 20.
70. 1958 LOS Conference, supra note 6, v. IV, p. 21. The Tunisian delegate recalled a recent incident,
when the Yugoslav merchant vessel Siovenija was stopped on the high seas and escorted to Oman where
a part of its cargo was confiscated. See the Yugoslav complaint about this incident, M., pp. 8-9, where
the Yugoslav delegate also noted that "no state was entitled to arrogate to itself, without the consent
of the international community, any rights regarding the high seas except those laid down in rules adopted
by joint agreement."
71. U., p. 31. For similar statements by the delegate of the Ukrainian S.S.R., see M., pp. 32 and 8182.
72. See id., p. 31. In support of such deletion, another delegate of the U.A.R. pointed out that proposals
similar to the one suggested in 1958 had been heavily defeated at the three recent conferences dealing
with slave trade which were mentioned by Mr. El Erian. U., p. 80.
73. U., pp. 82-83.
74. U., p. 90.
75. U., p. 83.
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76. 1958 LOS Conference, supra note 6, v. 2 (Plenary Meetings), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/38 (1958),
U.N. Pub!. No. 58.V.4, Vo!' 2, p. 22.
77. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 UST 2312, TIAS No. 5200,450 UNTS 82.
78. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, reprinted in United Nations,
The Law of the Sea, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub!. Sales No.
E.83.V.5. (Hereafter cited as the 1982 LOS Convention.)
79. See the discussion on this point in the Second Committee of the 1958 LOS Conference, supra note
6, v. 4, pp. 80, 90, 109, 149 (rejection of the Bulgarian proposal which would have granted immunity
also to government vessels used for commercial purposes).
80. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 77, Article 8, paragraph 2, and Article 22, paragraph
1. Only Article 21, relating to piracy, allows seizure also by "military aircraft" and "other ships or aircraft
on government service authorized to that effect." With respect to the applicability of that provision also
to Article 22, see the rather ambiguous statements by the United Kingdom in the Second Committee of
the First LOS Conference, summarized in 1958 LOS Conference, supra note 6, v. 4, pp. 108-9, and in the
Plenary, id., v. 2, p. 22.
81. See 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 78, Article 110, paras. 4 and 5, which parallel Article 107
relating to ships and aircraft which were entitled to seize a foreign ship on account of piracy. On the
one hand, it broadens its application to boarding of ships suspected of other illegal activities or flag misuse,
and, on the other hand, it narrows it from seizure to boarding only.
82. For U.S. acceptance of the navigation provisions of the 1982 Convention, see the Statement of
the President on United States Ocean Policy, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 19, No. 10,
pp. 383-85 (1983), reprinted in International Legal Materials, v. 22 (1983), p. 464.
83. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 77, Article 22; 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 78, Article
110, paragraph 1.
84. Id., Article 110, subparagraphs (l){c) and (d).
85. Id., Article 109.
86. European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside of
National Territories,January22, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 239. For the proposal by a group of European countries
to add a provision relating to unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.621
C.2/L.54 (1954), reprinted in Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records
(hereafter cited as the 1982 LOS Conference), v. 3, pp. 229-30, Article 21 ter. See also id., v. 2, p. 236,
paragraph 59, and p. 292, paragraph 2; id., v. 3, p. 134 (main trends, Provision 177); id., v. 4, p. 166 (Informal
Single Negotiating Text, Article 95 and Article 96, paragraph lc).
The delegation of Israel made a proposal to delete Article 109, paragraph 3, relating to the right of
various states to arrest and punish persons engaged in unauthorized broadcasting, to delete also Article
110, paragraph l(c) relating to boarding of ships engaged in that activity, and to allow instead the coastal
state to exercise control over such broadcasting in the 24-mile contiguous zone. See id., v. 15, p. 20,
paragraph 34; and Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/38 (1978), reprinted in Renate Platzoder, Third United Nations
Conference 011 the Law of the Sea: Documents (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1984), v. 5, p. 44.
No action was taken on this proposal as by that time the text prepared by the Second Committee became
practically immutable.
87. See the text preceding footnote 20 supra.
88. See 1958 LOS Conference, supra note 6, pp. 11-12 (para. 8).
89. A United States court in United States v. COrles, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979), quotes Oppenheim's
statement that it is "[i]n the interest of order on the open sea" that a stateless vessel enjoy no protection.
L. Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948), v. 1,
p. 546. According to another author, statelessness "robs a ship of privileges, and deprives it of a State
to espouse its cause when it suffers injustice at the hands of another State." Robert Reinow, Test of the
Nationality of a Merchant Vessel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 13.
In Nairn Molvall v. AI/orney-General of Palestine, [1948] A.C. 351, 369-70, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council stated that "[n]o question of comity or breach of international law can arise if there is
no State under whose flag the vessel sails." It added that, having no flag, a vessel cannot claim the protection
of any State, nor can "any State claim that any principle of international law was broken by her seizure."
A stateless vessel can be stopped by any warship, because, as the United States courts view the situation,
stateless vessels do not have the protection provided by a flag state. United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d
304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). "International law shelters only members
of the international community of nations from unlawful boarding and searches on the high seas." United
States v. COrles, supra at 110.
lt has to be remembered, however, that, as Mr. Francois has pointed out, a stateless vessel "should
not be treated as a pirate unless it actually commits acts of piracy." U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/17, supra notes
51, pp. 6-7.
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90. The Congress of the United States has denied assistance to countries which engage in "a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," including a "flagrant denial of
the right to life, liberty and the security of person." Foreign Assistance Act of1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2151n. Clearly, any United States legislation should be interpreted also in the spirit of these
pronouncements, thus avoiding any gross violation of internationally recognized human rights, both
substantive and procedural. See, e.g., Judge Faye, dissenting in United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 108182 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1978), cm. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980) ("I see no reason why a possible drug importer
on the high seas should have fewer rights when confronted by the Coast Guard than should a person
on land near the Mexican border when confronted by an officer of the Border Patrol").
It may be also noted that there is a strong connection between human rights and international security.
As President Reagan stated at Helsinki on May 27,1988, "[t]here is no true international security without
respect for human rights," and "[s]ecurity and human rights must be advanced together, or cannot truly
be secured at all." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 24 (1988), p. 6n, at 678,679.
It seems however, that some United States courts do not recognize any individual rights in the drug
interdiction cases beyond those gnaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Even this fundamental constitutional
guarantee is diluted on the high seas. United States v. Wi/Iiams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1082-84, 1089-90 (5th Cir.
1980). But see the concurring opinion by Judge Roney, in which five other judges joined, Id., at 1093
("Williams, as a United States citizen on a foreign ship, just as on foreign soil, does have constitutional
rights against an unreasonable search and seizure by United States Government authorities").
For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the arrest of foreign nationals on foreign
ships and the international law of human rights, see Louis B. Sohn, "International Law of the Sea and
Human Rights Issues," in Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., ed., The Law of the Sea: What Lies Ahead? (Honolulu,
Hi.: University of Hawaii, 1988), pp. 51-71.
91. See, for instance, the treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights between the United States
and Honduras, December 7, 1927, which provides in Article I that the "nationals of each High Contracting
Party shall enjoy freedom of access to courts of justice of the other ... for the defense of their rights,"
and "shall receive within the territories of the other ... the most constant protection and security for
their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that degree of protection that is required by
international law." 45 Statutes at Large 2618; Treaty Series No. 764, 8 Bevans 905; 87 LNTS 421. Similar
provisions may be found also in the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United
States and Liberia, August 8, 1938. 54 Statutes at Large 1739; Treaty Series No. 956; 9 Bevans 595; 201
LNTS 163. According to the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States
and Japan, April 2, 1953, "[n]ationals of either Party within the territories of the other Party shall be
free from unlawful molestations of every kind, and shall receive the most constant protection and security,
in no case less than required by international law," and "shall be accorded national treatment and mostfavored-nation treatment with respect to access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals
and agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and
in defense of their rights." Articles 2 and 4, 4 UST 2063, TIAS No. 2863, 206 UNTS 143.
92. See Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, September 28, 1954,360 U.N.T.S. 130
(in force with respect to more than thirty states, but not ratified by the United States). The Convention
contains generally accepted standards on the subject. After all, stateless persons retain their status as human
beings and should be treated as such. A state should accord such persons treatment at least as favorable
as that accorded to its own nationals or to aliens generally; in the latter case the requirement of reciprocity
should be waived. See id., Articles 3, 4, 7, 16. There is even a special provision for stateless seamen. Id.,
Article 11.
93. High Seas Convention, supra, note n, Article 6, paragraph 2, 1982 LOS Convention, supra, note
78, Article 92, paragraph 2.
94. The persons on board a ship assimilated to a stateless ship should be treated at least as well as
stateless persons (supra, note 92), or in accordance with their national status (supra, note 91).
95. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 UST 1606, TIAS
No. 5639, 516 UNTS 205.
96. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, v. 2, p. 59; id., v. 1, p. 207.
97. Id.
98. 1956 Report of the Commissiol!, supra note 69, p. 21; Yearbook of the Commission, 1956, v. 2,
p.275.
99. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1IL.53 (1958); reprinted in 1958 LOS Conference, supra note 6, v. III,
(First Committee), p. 226.
100. Id., p. 117, para. 43.
101. Id., p. 116, para. 36. This issue was also raised by the representative of Norway who pointed out
that if such a rule is going to be introduced, "it would not be natural to limit the new possibilities of
action against ships involved in the traffic [in narcotic drugs] to foreign ships in the territorial sea." Id.,
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p. 116, para. 40. The representative of Turkey tried again to broaden his proposal "to empower the coastal
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction even if the offense had been committed outside the territorial
sea," but the proposal was not pressed to a vote, when the Drafting Committee opposed it. IJ., p. 202,
paras. 46-49.
102. IJ., p. 116, paras. 34, 39.
103. IJ., paras. 40-41.
104. This change was suggested early in the Conference, and was incorporated promptly in the
negotiating text, with a minor amendment. See 1982 LOS Conference, Official Records, v. 3, p. 114; IJ.,
v. 4, p. 156; IJ., v. 5, p. 157.
105. IJ., v. 2, p. 237, para. 69.
106. IJ., v. 3, p. 133, Provision 174.
107. IJ., v. 4, p. 166.
108. See Platzoder, supra note 86, v. 5, pp. 66-70. The suggestion relating to an addition in Article 110
appeared earlier in 1975, in the anonymous "blue papers" of the Second Committee, suggesting changes
in the "main trends papers." See Platzoder, supra, v. 4, p. 137 (Provision 174B, para l(c)) and 145 (same
provision, with a note that consultations with respect to this matter have not been completed).
109. This procedure was suggested by Sir William Scott in 1817 (see supra, text preceding note 13),
and was followed by Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century. See, however, the objections to
this approach by the United States, supra, text preceding notes 14 and 16.
110. See Convention Relating to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and other Drugs, January 23,
1912,38 Statutes at Large 1912, Treaty Series No. 612, 1 Bevans 855; Agreement Concerning the Suppression
of the Manufacture of, International Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium, February 11, 1925, 51 League
of Nations Treaty Series, p. 337, Hudson, International Legislation, supra note 44, v. 3 (1931), p. 1580; Convention
on Traffic in Opium and Drugs, February 19,1925,81 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 317, Hudson,
supra p. 1589; Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs,
July 13, 1931,48 Statutes at Large 1543, U.S. Treaty Series No. 863, 139 League of Nations Treaty Series,
p. 301; Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, November 27, 1931, 177 League of
Nations Treaty Series, p. 373, Hudson, supra, v. 5 (1936), p. 1149; Convention for the Suppression of the
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, June 26, 1936, 12 U.N.T.S. 208, Hudson, supra v. 7 (1941), p. 359; Protocol
of December 11, 1946, amending the Agreements, Conventions, and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs ofJanuary
23,1912, February 11, 1925, February 19, 1925,July 13, 1931, November 27, 1931,June 26,1936,61 Statutes
at Large 2230, TJ.A.S. No. 1671,4 Bevans 267,12 U.N.T.S. 179; Protocol of November 19,1948, Bringing
under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the Convention of July 13, 1931, as amended,
2 U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 2308, 44 U.N.T.S. 277; Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation
of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, June
23, 1953, 14 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3.
111. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520
U.N.T.S. 204. For the amended text of the Convention, see 976 U.N.T.S. 105.
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165. IJ., para. 65.
166. IJ., p. 29, para. 63.
167. IJ., p. 41, para. 139. The representative cited in this connection paragraphs 4 and 7 of the principles
and objectives of the Inter-American Program of Action Against the Illicit Use and Production of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Traffic Therein, adopted by the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Rio de Janeiro, April 1986.
168. Report, supra note 163, p. 30, para. 66.
169. IJ., para. 67.
170. IJ., Draft resolution A.I, paras. 7-9.
171. U.N. Doc. E/RES/1988/8 (1988).
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